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1. Introduction 
A  quarter of  a century  has  passed  since  the  initial  outburst  of  formal 
theoretical  and  empirical  work  on  political  business  cycles,  that is,  on 
political  determinants  of macroeconomic  cycles.  On  the empirical side, 
there was Kramer's (1971) influential  study  of economic  determinants  of 
U.S. congressional  voting,  followed  by the work of Tufte (1975, 1978) and 
Fair (1978).1 Nordhaus's  (1975) pioneering  formal model  of the political 
business  cycle (PBC) due to opportunistic  pre-electoral manipulation  was 
published  exactly  twenty-five  years  ago.2 Soon  after, Hibbs  (1977) pre- 
sented  a model  of partisan  policymakers  (that is,  policymakers  having 
different  macroeconomic  goals)  in an environment  similar to that of the 
Nordhaus,  but  where  these  partisan  differences  were  the  key  driving 
force. Perhaps as influential in stimulating research was the 1972 Presiden- 
tial election  in the United States, in which  incumbent  Richard Nixon  was 
justifiably viewed  as engaging  in significant  pre-electoral manipulation.3 
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1. Early work on connections between politics and fluctuations in economic activity is 
reviewed in Kramer  (1971). 
2. Kalecki (1943) presented an early explicit model of the PBC; the political nature of 
economic fluctuations  was recognized by Schumpeter  (1939)  in his study of business 
cycles. Simultaneously  with Nordhaus, Lindbeck  (1976)  presented a similar  idea; soon 
after,  McRae  (1977)  also presented a formal  model of the PBC. 
3. Rogoff (1988) called Nixon "the all-time hero of political business cycles," at least in 
contemporary  U.S. history. Tufte (1978) begins his famous book on the PBC with a 
quotation  from 1814,  "A  Government  is not supported a hundredth  part  so much by the 76 *  DRAZEN 
Subsequent  to this flurry of research, there has been a large amount of 
further work.  Theoretical research has concentrated  on making both op- 
portunistic  and  partisan  models  consistent  with  voters  behaving  ratio- 
nally, both in forming  expectations  about future policy  and in voting  on 
the basis of those expectations.  The success  of opportunistic  pre-electoral 
manipulation  was rationalized  by assuming  that there is imperfect infor- 
mation  about an incumbent's  competence,  with  expansionary  policy be- 
fore an election  taken as an indicator  of high  competence,  as in the pio- 
neering work of Rogoff (1990) and Rogoff and Sibert (1988), and in papers 
that followed.  A partisan postelectoral  cycle was argued to be consistent 
with rational expectations  in the important work by Alesina  (1987, 1988). 
On the empirical side there has been  extensive  work testing  the original 
and  subsequent  models,  and more  generally,  looking  for empirical  evi- 
dence  of political  determinants  of business-cycle  activity. In his  NBER 
Macroeconomics  Annual paper in 1988, Alesina presented  an excellent  sum- 
mary of much  of the work up to that time. 
It is over a decade  since Alesina's  paper was  published.  It now  seems 
like  a good  time  to  look  at the  past  twenty-five  years  of  work  and  to 
evaluate  the  state  of the  literature.  What is our current state  of under- 
standing  of the PBC, both theoretically  and empirically? On what points 
is there agreement  and on what  points  is there still significant  disagree- 
ment?  How  well  do  the  models  explain  the  data? What  does  existing 
theory  as well  as data suggest  about directions  for future research? 
The short  answer  to these  questions  is that we  have  learned  quite  a 
bit, with  agreement  on a number  of issues,  but still significant  disagree- 
ment  on  others.  On  the  empirical  side,  there  are  a  number  of  clear 
electoral  effects  on  macroeconomic  variables.  However,  at least  for the 
opportunistic  model  in  developed  countries,  there  is  much  less  hard 
evidence  than both the theoretical models  and the conventional  wisdom 
about  the  prevalence  of  "election-year  economics"  would  suggest.  Al- 
though  there is wide  (but not  universal)  agreement  that aggregate  eco- 
nomic  conditions  affect election  outcomes  in the United  States,  there is 
significant  disagreement  about whether  there is opportunistic  manipula- 
tion  that  can be  observed  in  the  macro  data.  There  is  a clear partisan 
effect  in  the  United  States  (as  well  as  in  some  other  countries),  with 
economic  activity being lower in the first part of Republican than Demo- 
cratic administrations,  but still disagreement  about the underlying  driv- 
ing  mechanisms.  On  the  theoretical  side,  many  of the  leading  models 
have  been  criticized  for  implausibility  of  key  assumptions.  Two  key 
constant,  uniform,  quiet prosperity  of the country as by those damned  spurts which  Pitt 
used  to have just in the nick of time." The  Political  Business  Cycle  after  25 Years  ?  77 
points,  as I will  discuss  below,  are: first,  the  assumption  of seemingly 
irrational behavior by the public in some  of the models;  and, second,  the 
reliance on monetary  surprises  as the driving  force. 
The purpose  of this  paper  is twofold:  first to present  a short  review 
and critical assessment  of the existing  literature, both opportunistic  and 
partisan  models,  the  principal  aim being  to  point  out  what  we  know 
empirically  and  to  what  extent  existing  models  explain  the  empirical 
regularities.  A principal  conclusion  is that models  based  on manipulat- 
ing  the  economy  via  monetary  policy  are unconvincing  both  theoreti- 
cally and empirically, while  explanations  based  on fiscal policy  conform 
much  better  to  the  data  and  form  a  stronger  basis  for  a  convincing 
theoretical  model  of electoral  effects  on  economic  outcomes.  Second,  I 
present a new  model  of political cycles based on Rogoff's  (1990) model of 
political budget  cycles,  extended  to include  monetary  policy. The model 
is the  first to incorporate  both  monetary  and  fiscal policy  in a rational 
opportunistic  framework with  separate monetary  and fiscal authorities.4 
This  separation  of  monetary  policy  from  the  direct  control  of  elected 
officials is crucial for a number  of reasons.  It is both in sharp contrast to 
existing PBC models  and far more institutionally  realistic than the policy- 
making structure in those  models.  Moreover, it is crucial to the nature of 
the electoral cycle, which  depends  on the interaction between  the incum- 
bent politician  who  can influence  fiscal policy  and an independent  cen- 
tral bank that controls  monetary  aggregates  and interest rates, but may 
be pressured  to accommodate  fiscal shocks.  We also present  some  non- 
parametric empirical evidence  in favor of the active-fiscal,  passive-monetary 
(AFPM) model  of the opportunistic  PBC. 
The roadmap  for the paper is as follows.  In the next section  I quickly 
review  the  opportunistic  PBC model  based  on  expansionary  monetary 
shocks  and present  a conceptual  assessment.  In Section  3 the empirical 
work on this approach is summarized.  In Section 4 1 move  on to partisan 
models  driven  by  monetary  policy,  both  the  original  Hibbs  model  and 
Alesina's  rational partisan model.  In Section 5 the empirical evidence  on 
partisan effects on macroeconomic  outcomes  is reviewed.  In Section 6, I 
sum  up  what  I consider  to be  the  conceptual  and  empirical  problems 
with  monetary-based  PBC models  and  present  evidence  in  favor  of  a 
fiscal-based  model.  In Section  7 recent work on fiscal cycles  in develop- 
ing countries  is summarized,  both  theoretical  extensions  of the political 
budget-cycle  model  of Rogoff  (1990), and  empirical  results  supporting 
the importance  of fiscal influences  in political business  cycles  in a wide 
4. Rogoff and Sibert (1988) present  a model  of fiscal-based  PBC with  inflation  effects,  but 
where  both tax and inflation policy  are chosen  by a single  authority. 78 *  DRAZEN 
range of countries.  In Section  8, two central questions  related to a fiscal- 
based  PBC model  are posed;  the answers  presented  motivate  the AFPM 
model  of  Section  9,  which  combines  election-influenced  fiscal  policy 
with  accommodating  monetary  policy.  In Section  10,  I take  a look  at 
some  data  for  the  United  States  that  are  consistent  with  the  AFPM 
model,  and I present  concluding  comments. 
2.  The  Monetary  Opportunistic  Model 
Beginning  with  Nordhaus's  (1975)  model,  early  models  of  the  PBC, 
whether  opportunistic  or partisan,  were  based  on  monetary  policy  as 
the  driving  force.  Expansionary  monetary  policy  led  to  a  temporary 
increase  in  economic  activity,  followed  with  a  lag,  by  an  increase  in 
inflation.  Models  differed  in  the  motivation  of  policymakers,  as  well 
as in the modeling  of expectation  formation,  and these  differences  led to 
very different types  of politically induced  economic  cycles.  Nonetheless, 
it is  useful  to  review  monetary-based  models  as  a group  in  assessing 
their  success  in  explaining  a PBC. All  are based  on  some  variant  of  a 
basic  three-equation  framework,  one  equation  representing  the  pol- 
icymaker's  objective,  one  giving  the  relation  between  changes  in  the 
rate of money  growth  or inflation on the one hand and economic  activity 
on the other (a Phillips  curve),  and finally, one  specifying  how  expecta- 
tions  of  inflation  are  formed.  We begin  with  a brief  review  of  these 
models,  brief because we simply  want to point out some of their theoreti- 
cal  shortcomings  and  to  summarize  empirical  tests  of  their  ability  to 
explain political business  cycles.  This review,  contained  in Sections  2, 3, 
4, and 5, is based  on Chapter  7 of Drazen  (2000a), where  a fuller treat- 
ment  may be found. 
2.1 NORDHAUS'S  OPPORTUNISTIC  MODEL 
Nodhaus's  model  was  meant  to show  that if voting  were  based  on eco- 
nomic performance in the recent past and if expectations  of inflation were 
backward-looking,  an opportunistic  incumbent who controlled monetary 
policy would  find it optimal  to induce  an inflation-unemployment  cycle 
corresponding  to  the  length  of  his  term,  with  a boom  just  before  an 
election  and a recession  afterwards. 
The  structure  of  the  economy  is  summarized  by  a  nonstochastic, 
expectations-adjusted  Phillips  curve, yielding  an inflation-output  trade- 
off. 
Xt  =  iTt 
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where  xt is the deviation  of actual from potential  output  and where  the 
monetary  authority  is assumed  to control the inflation rate Tri.5 
The objective  of the policymaker  is to maximize  his probability of re- 
election.  Voting behavior  is retrospective,  in that it depends  on economic 
performance  under the incumbent  in the past.  Economic performance in 
a period is measured  by the behavior  of inflation and unemployment,  so 
that  voter  dissatisfaction  in  any  period  can  be  represented  by  a loss 
function  of the form 
2  2( 
where  ir is the electorate's  target rate of inflation,  x is the target rate of 
economic  activity  (relative  to  potential  output),  and  a  is  the  relative 
weight  the  electorate  puts  on  output  fluctuations  relative  to  inflation 
fluctuations.  An  opportunistic  policymaker  will  choose  the  policy  that 
attracts most  voters,  so  that  these  parameters  could  be  thought  of  as 
representing  the preferences  of the median  voter. 
In the basic model,  one then posits  a retrospective  voting  function  for 
an election  at the end of period  t, of the form: 
Nt = N (  8_  ,) +Et,  (2a) 
s=O0 
yielding  the  number  of  votes  Nt as  a function  of  voters's  well-being, 
where N'(-) < 0. The exogenous  length of time between  elections  is T + 1 
periods,  0 <  8 <  1 is the factor with which voters discount  past economic 
performance  (a "forgetfulness  coefficient"), and Et is a mean-zero  stochas- 
tic term relating economic  performance  to electoral outcomes.  The elec- 
toral mechanism  is not made  more specific.  The standard  opportunistic 
PBC model  assumes  that  8 is small,  in the  sense  that recent  economic 
performance  counts  far more  heavily  in influencing  voter  choices  than 
economic  performance  in the more distant past.  The stochastic  element 
is added  to allow  for the possibility  of an incumbent  losing  the election. 
To close  the  model  one  must  specify  the  formation  of  expectations. 
5. In order to reproduce  the regularity  of high  inflation  lagging  the monetary  expansion, 
one must decouple  money  growth  and inflation.  A simple  assumption  along these  lines 
is that inflation  reflects money  growth  in the previous  period,  that is,  Trt  =  /t-l,  with  u, 
being  the monetary  authority's  control variable, and with  the divergence  of actual from 
potential  output  depending  on the difference  between  the actual rate of money  growth 
and  the economy-wide  expected  rate of money  growth  A/.  See Chapter  7.3 of Drazen 
(2000a) for precise  details. 80- DRAZEN 
Crucial  to  the  main  results  of  the  Nordhaus  model  is  some  form  of 
adaptive  expectations.  A standard  formulation  of adaptive  inflation  ex- 
pectations  is: 
T  =  /-  +  -0(  i  -  t-  1)  (3) 
where  0 is  a coefficient  between  0 and  1 representing  the  speed  with 
which  expectations  adapt to past inflation.  What is crucial in the forma- 
tion  of  expectations  is  that  it  does  not depend  on  the  expectation  of 
future policies,  so that expectations  are not rational. It is this characteris- 
tic (combined  with  the absence  of any other connections  between  peri- 
ods)  which  gives  the  incumbent  policymaker  an  exploitable  trade-off 
between  inflation  and  unemployment  in  the  attempt  to  affect election 
outcomes. 
Voter behavior  in  the  Nordhaus  model  is  backward-looking  in  two 
dimensions:  voting  depends  on  past  incumbent  performance,  and  ex- 
pectations  of  money  growth  depend  only  on  past  inflation  rates.  The 
incumbent  policymaker  elected  at t-3  chooses  inflation  rates  t-3t 'rt_2, 
1Tt-_,  and  irt to  maximize  his  expected  vote  in  the  next  election.  This 
simple  structure yields  the following  behavior  of incumbents  who  wish 
to maximize  the probability  of remaining  in office.  Immediately  preced- 
ing  an election  the  government  stimulates  the economy  via expansion- 
ary monetary  policy.  The  levels  of monetary  expansion  and  economic 
activity  are those  that maximize  voter  satisfaction  in an election  period 
taken  alone.  In the  period  immediately  after the  election,  the  govern- 
ment  reverses  course.  It engineers  a recession  via contractionary  mone- 
tary  policy  to  bring  down  inflationary  expectations.  The  incumbent 
keeps  economic  activity  low  to  keep  expected  inflation  low  until  the 
period  immediately  before  the  next  election,  so  that  a  given  rate  of 
economic  expansion  (induced  by a monetary  surprise)  can be obtained 
at a relatively  low  rate of inflation.  In the next  election  cycle,  the  same 
behavior  is  repeated.  Hence,  we  have  a simple  example  in which  the 
possibility  of influencing  the  probability  of re-election,  combined  with 
the  structure  of  the  economy,  yields  a cycle  in economic  activity.  [The 
exact solution  may be found  in any treatment  of the Nordhaus  model, 
for example,  Drazen  (2000a, p. 233-236).] 
2.2 CONCEPTUAL  CRITIQUE 
There  are  three  general  conceptual  criticisms  of  the  basic  Nordhaus 
model  as a tool for explaining  a PBC. First, it assumes  that the president 
controls  monetary  policy,  an  assumption  that  is  inconsistent  with  the 
independence  of the  Federal Reserve.  Although  some  observers  argue The  Political  Business  Cycle  after  25 Years  *  81 
that decisions  on monetary  policy in the United States are strongly  influ- 
enced  by the executive  branch,  the notion  that the president  can easily 
use  monetary  policy  as  an  electoral  tool  does  not  fit the  institutional 
facts.  A more  subtle  argument  is that an independent  Federal Reserve 
may be especially  willing  to accommodate  the  executive  branch's  pres- 
sures for monetary policy during election years in order to prevent sharp 
movements  in interest  rates which  would  lead  the Fed to be criticized. 
We return to this argument below. 
A second,  more serious  problem  with  the Nordhaus  model  is its reli- 
ance  on  irrational behavior  on  the  part of voters.  Voters are naive,  not 
simply in the way they form expectations  of inflation, but also in the way 
they assess  government  performance.  Any voter who  has lived through 
an election  cycle  in Nordhaus's  world  should  not be fooled  into voting 
for an opportunistic,  manipulative  policymaker.  He  will know  that the 
pre-election  period  of low  inflation  and  high  economic  activity will  be 
followed  by a postelection  period  of both high  inflation  and high unem- 
ployment.  He should  therefore punish  rather than reward an incumbent 
who  engages  in pre-electoral  manipulation. 
Finally,  and  more  generally,  one  may  question  the  central  role  as- 
signed  to moving  along  the Phillips  curve to reduce  unemployment  via 
inflation  surprises.  Fiscal policy  plays  no  role in the PBC in the model, 
though  transfers and other types  of fiscal policy appear to play an impor- 
tant role in some  episodes  of pre-electoral  policy  manipulation. 
3.  Empirical  Tests  of the  Nordhaus  Model 
There have been  many  econometric  tests  of the monetary  opportunistic 
PBC, both for economic  outcomes  and for policy instruments.  The most 
common  form of econometric  test of these  models  in terms of outcomes 
is  to  run  an  autoregression  of  an  economic  performance  measure  on 
itself,  a small  set of economic  variables,  and political  dummies  to test a 
specific  theory. Consider  a regression  of the form: 
Yt =  aiYt-i +  b  +  bjXt +  dPDUMt  +  Et,  (4) 
i=l  j 
where  Y is an outcome  variable such  as GDP, the Xj are other economic 
variables  that may  also  affect  Y, such  as world  economic  activity,  and 
PDUM is a political dummy  variable (or set of variables) meant to repre- 
sent  a given  political  model.  The  autoregressive  specification  for Yt is 
adopted  as a parsimonious  representation  of the time-series  behavior  of 82 *  DRAZEN 
Yt, instead  of  using  a structural  model.  For example,  as  a test  of  the 
Nordhaus  model  on quarterly data, Alesina  and Roubini (1992), Alesina, 
Cohen,  and Roubini (1992), and Alesina,  Roubini,  and Cohen  (1997) use 
a dummy  variable  that equals  1 in the  election  quarter and  in the  T-1 
quarters before the election,  and 0 otherwise,  where  T may equal 4, 6, or 
8.  As  the  measure  of economic  activity  Y they  take the  year-over-year 
growth  rate of GNP  or an unemployment  measure,  the exact specifica- 
tion depending  on the model  and data set. 
3.1 THE  EFFECT  OF ECONOMIC  CONDITIONS  ON ELECTIONS 
Prior to discussing  the effect of elections on macroeconomic  variables, one 
must  consider  the  effect  of economic  conditions  on  elections.  A crucial 
assumption  in  the  Nordhaus  model,  or in  any  model  of  pre-electoral 
manipulation,  is  that  voters  vote  on  the  basis  of  economic  variables. 
Kramer (1971) regressed  votes  received  by the incumbent  party in U.S. 
congressional  elections  on  two  measures  of performance  in the year of 
the  election-the  growth  rate of real per capita income  and the rate of 
inflation  in  that  year-and  found  they  were  both  significant  determi- 
nants of vote totals. The importance  of economic  conditions  for voting  in 
congressional  elections  was  confirmed  by Tufte (1975).6 
The most influential  work was probably that of Fair (1978) [updated  in 
Fiar (1982, 1988)], who  found  similar results for the United  States.  In his 
original  article, Fair looked  at presidential  elections  from  1916 through 
1976,  arguing  that  if voters  hold  the  party  that  holds  the  presidency 
accountable  for economic  events,  their  influence  should  be  seen  most 
strongly  in  presidential  elections.  Fair found  that  the  change  in  real 
economic  activity in the year of the election,  as measured  either by the 
change  in real per  capita GNP  or the  change  in unemployment  in the 
election  year, does  appear to have an important effect on votes  for presi- 
dent.  Specifically,  a 1% increase in the growth  rate increases  the incum- 
bent's  vote  total by about  1%. (Further evidence  suggests  it may be the 
growth  of real per capita GNP  in the  second  and  third quarters of the 
election  year  that  is  important,  but  data  limitations  prevent  Fair from 
drawing  any definitive  conclusions  about what  part of the election  year 
is most  important  in determining  voter behavior.)  Given  the growth  of 
economic  activity,  other measures  of macroeconomic  performance  con- 
tribute little; the  most  important  of the  other measures  is the  inflation 
rate  in  the  two-year  period  before  the  election,  as  measured  by  the 
change  in the GNP deflator. A second  key finding  of Fair's is that voters 
6. Though  most  studies  confirm  the  basic  results,  Stigler  (1973) concluded  that congres- 
sional  election  results  are not affected by economic  fluctuations.  See also Okun's  (1973) 
comment  on Stigler, as well  as Arcelus  and Meltzer (1975) and Bloom and Price (1975). The  Political  Business  Cycle  after  25 Years  *  83 
appear to have a high discount  rate on past economic  performance; they 
don't look back more than a year or two.7 
Numerous  other articles find similar results on the importance  of pre- 
election  conditions  on  voting  patterns  in  both  the  United  States  and 
other  countries.  Looking  at voting  or popularity  functions,  Lewis-Beck 
(1988) found  that the sort of results  that Kramer and Fair report for the 
United  States hold  in Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, and Spain as 
well.  Madsen  (1980) reported similar results  for Denmark,  Norway,  and 
Sweden.8  We summarize  this as: 
REGULARITY  1  Aggregate economic conditions before  an election, specifically 
per capita output or income growth (and to a lesser extent inflation), have a 
significant effect on voting patterns in the United States and other countries. 
3.2 ECONOMIC  ACTIVITY 
Numerous  econometric  tests provide  little support  for the political cycle 
in economic  activity  predicted  by  the Nordhaus  model.  Studies  for the 
United  States  began  with  McCallum's  (1978) study  of  unemployment 
fluctuations  before  elections.  Alt  and  Chrystal  (1983) summarize  early 
empirical  studies  as  showing  a  striking  lack  of  support,  a  point  re- 
inforced  by results  summarized  in Alesina,  Roubini,  and Cohen  (1997). 
Faust and Irons (1999), using  more  sophisticated  techniques,  come  to a 
similar conclusion.  Figure 1, showing  mean rates of GNP growth (season- 
ally  adjusted)  by  quarter  of  the  president's  term  in  the  United  States 
from 1948 to 1998, illustrates  the point.9 
Similarly, no evidence  was  found  in developed  economies  outside  the 
United  States for a Nordhaus-style  PBC for unemployment  or economic 
growth  (Paldam,  1979; Lewis-Beck,  1988). Alesina,  Roubini,  and Cohen 
7. One should distinguish aggregate from individual economic conditions on voting. 
Lewis-Beck  (1988)  argues that individuals  vote on the basis of national  economic  perfor- 
mance (sociotropic  voting) rather  than their own personal economic situation  ("narrow 
pocketbook"  voting). 
8. What about the effect of economic conditions on the timing of elections when govern- 
ments can call early elections?  Ito (1990)  finds evidence that governments in Japan  do 
not manipulate  policies in anticipation  of upcoming  elections,  but that they opportunisti- 
cally manipulate the timing of elections to take advantage of autonomous economic 
expansions. Specifically,  high growth significantly  increases  the probability  of an elec- 
tion, while high inflation significantly reduces it. Chowdhury (1993) reports similar 
results for India,  with the government  more likely to call early  elections when economic 
times are good. On the other hand, Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini  (1993),  argue that for a 
sample of 14 OECD  countries  with endogenous election timing, there is no evidence of 
such an effect in countries  other than Japan. 
9. A plot of median growth rates, or of other measures of aggregate  economic activity,  for 
the United States  would tell a similar  story. 84 *  DRAZEN 
Figure  1 MEAN GNP GROWTH  RATE,  1948-1998 
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(1997) reject  an  opportunistic  cycle  in  real  activity  for  a sample  of  18 
OECD countries  over the period  1960-1993.10 
We summarize  the  general  consensus  that the  opportunistic  PBC re- 
ceives  little support  in the pre-electoral  behavior  of GNP or unemploy- 
ment  as: 
REGULARITY  2  There  is no significant increase in aggregate  economic  activity 
prior to elections in either the United States or other OECD countries. 
3.3 INFLATION 
The postelectoral  increase in inflation predicted  by the Nordhaus  model 
receives  support  in some  countries  and not  in others.  Alesina,  Cohen, 
and  Roubini  (1992) and  Alesina,  Roubini,  and  Cohen  (1997) test  for a 
political  cycle in inflation  (measured  as the  growth  rate of the CPI over 
the previous  4 quarters), using  the same data set and methodology  they 
used  for GNP growth,  and defining  a political  dummy  equal to 1 in the 
election  quarter and in the 3 quarters following the election,  and 0 other- 
wise.  In a pooled  cross-section,  time-series  regression,  they find a highly 
10. If aggregate economic performance  is important  in determining  the way people vote 
and governments  want to win re-election,  why don't we observe a clear  opportunistic 
PBC?  Lewis-Beck  (1988)  argues  that it is because it is exceedingly  hard  to time economic 
manipulation.  Monetary  and fiscal policy can be used only with great imprecision,  so 
that politicians cannot expect to time the aggregate stimulus to come right before an 
election, while the risks associated  with a mistimed  expansion  are  high. Another  expla- 
nation is that opportunistic  politicians  target  transfers  to a fraction  of voters  with minor 
effect on aggregate  economic activity.  The AFPM  model in Section 9 includes both of 
these possibilities. The  Political  Business  Cycle  after  25 Years  *  85 
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significant  coefficient  of  the  correct  sign  on  the  political  dummy;  in 
the  individual  country  regressions,  they  find  the  coefficient  is  of  the 
correct sign  in almost  all the regressions,  and  significant  at the  10% or 
higher  level  for Denmark,  France,  Germany,  Italy, and  New  Zealand. 
Overall,  they  conclude  the PBC effect on inflation  is widespread  across 
OECD countries  (on the basis of their pooled  regression)  and on a much 
stronger  empirical  footing  than the effect on GNP and unemployment. 
The evidence  for the United States is less clear. In similar tests to those 
described  above,  Alesina,  Roubini,  and Cohen  (1997) reject the existence 
of a postelectoral  surge in inflation over the period  1947-1994.  However, 
the behavior  of inflation after elections  changed  over this sample  period. 
After 1979 there is no evidence  of a political inflation cycle, which  corre- 
sponds  to  the  timing  of the  change  in Federal  Reserve  policy  rules  in 
1979. (See,  for example,  the estimated  policy  rules in Clarida, Gali, and 
Gertler, 2000.) Prior to this however,  there is more evidence  of a possible 
postelectoral  increase  in inflation.  This is consistent  with  other studies, 
and  is  illustrated  in  Figures  2  and  3,  showing  mean  annualized  CPI 
inflation  (seasonally  adjusted)  from  1960 to  1979 vs.  1979 to  1998 by 
quarter of the president's  term.  (A graph for 1948-1979  looks very simi- 
lar to 1960-1979,  but the latter is used  for better comparability with later 
figures.) 
To summarize: 
REGULARITY  3  In many OECD countries there  is a clear  postelectoral  increase 
in inflation. In the United States, there  is evidence  of such a postelectoral  increase 
in inflation prior to 1979, but no evidence  thereafter. 86 *  DRAZEN 
Figure  3 MEAN  INFLATION  RATE  (CPI),  1979-1998 
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3.4  MONETARY INSTRUMENTS 
Not  surprisingly,  the  results  for expansionary  monetary  policy  before 
elections  mirror those  for inflation after elections.  Using  the same politi- 
cal dummy  they  did  for inflation,  Alesina,  Cohen,  and  Roubini  (1992) 
find a significant political effect for the yearly Ml  growth  rates in pooled 
cross-section,  time-series  regressions  in their sample  of OECD countries, 
with  money  growth  being  higher  for the year to year-and-a-half  before 
elections.  In the country  regressions,  the results  are less  strong,  though 
a number  of countries  display  significant  effects. 
For the United States, the sensitivity  of the inflation results to the time 
period considered  is seen in money  growth rates as well. Alesina,  Cohen, 
and Roubini (1992) find only very weak evidence  of a political monetary 
cycle in the postwar  period,  a conclusion  reinforced in Alesina,  Roubini, 
and Cohen  (1997) for the period  1949-1994.  In contrast, Grier (1989) and 
Beck (1987) both find significant support for an office-motivated  model of 
monetary policy in the United States over the subperiod  1960-1980.  Grier, 
using  U.S.  quarterly data from 1961 to 1982, regresses  M1 growth  on its 
previous value, the full-employment  deficit, and a political dummy  speci- 
fied  as a fifteen-quarter  second-degree  polynomial  distributed  lag on  a 
dummy  which  takes a value of one in the election quarter and zero other- 
wise.  (The polynomial  distributed lag is chosen  to conserve  on degrees  of 
freedom.)  He finds that the timing  of an election  significantly  influences 
money  growth,  even when  fluctuations  in output,  interest rates, and the 
deficit  are held  constant.  Beck (1987) also  finds  a political  cycle  in the 
money  supply  in the United States over the same period.  Figures 4 and 5 
present  mean  M1 growth  rates  (seasonally  adjusted)  by  quarter of the 
president's  term over the periods 1960-1979 and 1979-1998.  Interestingly, 
Beck finds no similar cycle in monetary  instruments,  such as reserves  or The  Political  Business  Cycle  after  25 Years  - 87 
Figure  4 MEAN M1 GROWTH  RATE,  1960-1978 
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the  federal  funds  rate, a point  made  clear in Figure 6, giving  the mean 
federal funds rate by quarter of term from 1959 to 1998. The difference  in 
results  for the behavior  of money  growth  and instruments  of monetary 
control  will  be  central  to  our  model  of  the  PBC presented  below.  We 
summarize  these  results  as: 
REGULARITY  4  There is evidence of a pre-electoral  increase in money growth 
rates in many countries. In the United States, there  is a pre-electoral  effect  from 
1960 to 1980, but none thereafter.  There  is no evidencefor  the United States of an 
electoral  cycle in the  federal  funds rate. 88 *  DRAZEN 
Figure  6 MEAN  FEDERAL  FUNDS RATE,  1959-1998 
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4.  Monetary  Partisan  Models 
The basic partisan model  starts with the observation  that right-wing  and 
left-wing  parties have  different positions  on economic  issues  and hence 
different  macroeconomic  objectives.  In terms  of  the  objective  function 
(2), they  have  different  preferences  over  inflation  and  unemployment, 
both  in inflation  and  unemployment  targets  and  the  relative  dislike  of 
inflation  vs.  unemployment. 
4.1 THE  BASIC  HIBBS  MODEL 
The partisan  PBC model  was  introduced  by Hibbs  (1977). To represent 
the  difference  in interests,  we  replace  the  social  loss  function  (2) by  a 
partisan loss function: 
.  -  .  X7)2  (it  --TJ)2 
si-=aj  (xt-  +-  (X  i-  (5)  2  2 
for party j, where  Vi'  is party j's target rate of inflation,  xi is party j's target 
for economic  activity, and a?  is the relative weight  put on output  fluctua- 
tions relative to inflation fluctuations  by party j. There are two parties,  a 
left-wing  party, denoted  L, and a right-wing  party, denoted  R. The two 
parties  are characterized  by  the  following  possible  differences  in their 
objectives.  First, the  left-wing  party  may  have  a higher  target for eco- 
nomic  activity  than  the  right-wing  party.  Second,  the  left-wing  party 
may assign  a larger cost to deviations  of economic  activity from its target 
level than to deviations  of inflation from the target. Finally, the left-wing 
party may have  a higher inflation target than the right-wing  party, inde- 
pendent of the effects  on economic  activity via the Phillips  curve,  which The  Political  Business  Cycle  after  25 Years  *  89 
could  reflect other effects  of inflation viewed  differently by the two par- 
ties.  To summarize  the difference between  the parties: 
xL  >  jR 
aL >  aR,  (6) 
To obtain the partisan  cycles,  at least one  of these  must  hold  with  strict 
inequality. 
Fluctuations  in  economic  activity  induced  by  these  partisan  differ- 
ences  are generated  in the basic Hibbs  model  by  movements  along  an 
exploitable  Phillips curve, where  it is assumed,  as in the basic Nordhaus 
model,  that expectations  are not rational. Thus,  the left-wing  party will 
pursue  a  more  expansionary  monetary  policy  throughout  its  term.11 
How  long these  effects last depend  on the exact specification  of expecta- 
tions.  In an adaptive  expectations  framework,  the more slowly  inflation 
expectations  adjust  to  actual inflation,  the  longer  will  be  the  partisan 
effect. 
A basic  criticism  of the  original  Hibbs  model  is the  same  as the  one 
that was  applied  to the  Nordhaus  model,  namely  that it relies  on mis- 
taken  expectations  of  what  policy  will  be  in  order  to  get  real effects. 
Hence,  to the extent that it is assumed  that monetary  policy is used to hit 
partisan unemployment  and growth targets, the explanation of the politi- 
cal business  cycle is unsatisfactory. 
4.2 ALESINA'S  RATIONAL-PARTISAN  MODEL 
Alesina  (1987,  1988) introduced  rational  expectations  into  a monetary- 
based PBC, influenced  by the criticism of models based on an exploitable 
Phillips  curve.  In his  partisan  model  with  rational  expectations,  only 
surprise  inflation  affects  output,  leading  to  Alesina's  terming  the  ap- 
proach  the  rational-partisan  model.  The  rational-partisan  model  can be 
represented  by  a similar  three-equation  model  to  that  used  by  Nord- 
haus,  retaining the expectations-augmented  Phillips curve (1) but chang- 
ing the other two components.  First, following  Hibbs,  the motivation  of 
policymakers  is  quite  different  than  in  the  Nordhaus  model:  they  are 
purely  partisan,  with  no  opportunistic  motives  and hence  no  desire  to 
manipulate  outcomes.  To represent  the  difference  between  economic 
effects  in  the  early  part and  the  latter part of  an incumbent's  term  of 
office, Alesina  divides  a term of office into two periods  and assumes  that 
11. As in the Nordhaus model, the key assumption here is that, in spite of the Federal 
Reserve's  formal  autonomy  in the United States, monetary  policy reflects  the adminis- 
tration's  macroeconomic  goals. 90 *  DRAZEN 
there  is  an  election  every  other  period,  say  at  t,  t+2,  t+4,  ....  It is 
assumed  that a party cares only about its own  term of office,  so that the 
objective  function  of  party j  at time  t may  then  be  represented  by  an 
extended  version  of (5), namely 
AI=  aj (Xt 
- 
,j)2  (.  - _j)2 
A{-=o^  ^  4+-  ^  (7) 
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for party j,  where  f  and  xi are the  partisan  targets,  ai is  the  relative 
weight  put on output  deviations  by party j, and ,  is the discount  factor. 
These  are characterized,  as in the Hibbs model,  by (6) above,  where,  in 
order to obtain the cycles  in the rational-partisan  model,  at least one  of 
the inequalities  in (6) must be strict. 
The  other  crucial change,  relative  to  both  the  Nordhaus  and  Hibbs 
models,  is that Alesina  replaces the assumption  of adaptive  expectations 
by rational expectations,  so instead of (3), expected  inflation  rr is given by 
t  =  E_ 1(rt).  (8) 
In determining  the evolution  of inflation and unemployment  during a 
term of office,  say  t and  t+ 1, the key variable in the model  is expected 
inflation in those  periods,  this expectation  being  formed before the elec- 
tion in period  t. Conditional  on expected  inflation in each half term, the 
party in power  chooses  its optimal  policy, by maximizing  (7) subject to 
(1). We retain the assumption  from earlier models  that the government 
has  perfect  control  over  inflation.  In turn,  expectations  of inflation  de- 
pend  on the expectation  of who  will win  the upcoming  election.  If out- 
comes  were  fully known,  there would  be no cycle,  since a party's policy 
would  be fully anticipated  and hence  have  no effect on real activity. 
The existence  of a cycle  thus  depends  on  uncertainty  about  election 
outcomes.  Expected  inflation  for the  half  term after the  election  is the 
weighted  sum  of the  two  parties'  policies,  weighted  by  the probability 
that each will win  the election,  namely, 
'e  =  qLrtL  +  (1  - 
qL)r,  (9) 
where  qL  is the probability that the left-wing  party will win  the election, 
and where  7rtL  and  Tr' are the optimal  policies  of the two  parties in the The Political Business Cycle after 25 Years  *  91 
first half of the term, which  depend  not only on their policy  preferences 
(6), but  also  on  the  election  probability  qL itself,  as optimal  policy  de- 
pends  on  7Tr. Since the left-wing  party follows  a more inflationary policy 
once  in office  than  the  right-wing  party, expected  inflation  is between 
these  two values.  Hence,  there is a positive  inflation  surprise if the left- 
wing  party wins  the election,  implying  unemployment  below  the natu- 
ral rate, and a negative  inflation  surprise if the left-wing  party wins  the 
election,  implying  unemployment  above  the natural rate. In the second 
half of a president's  term, there are no fluctuations  in economic  activity, 
as the identity  of the party in power  is known  when  contracts are signed 
(in the  first part of the  term).  In contrast,  Hibbs's  partisan  model  sug- 
gests higher economic  activity in left-wing  administrations  than in right- 
wing  administrations  over the life of the term.12 
4.3 A CONCEPTUAL  ASSESSMENT  OF THE 
RATIONAL-PARTISAN  MODEL 
The theoretical structure of the rational-partisan model raises a number of 
questions  about the underlying  driving  forces.  First, and most  difficult, 
there is the question  of whether the underlying  microeconomic  structure, 
namely  nominal  wage  contracts signed  before elections,  makes  sense  in 
the  context  of  the  model.  The  question  of  microfoundations  is  often 
raised  about  models  in  which  policymakers  exploit  an  expectations- 
augmented  Phillips curve, but the importance  of electoral effects gives  it 
special  importance  here.  A standard  argument,  used  also by Alesina,  is 
that nominal wage  contracts are signed  at discrete intervals, where nomi- 
nal wage  increases  reflect rationally  anticipated  inflation at the time the 
contract is signed,  so that surprise  inflation between  contract dates  can 
have  real effects  even  when  agents  are rational.  The basic problem,  as 
Rogoff (1988) points  out, is that, on the one hand,  elections  are an impor- 
tant source  of fluctuations  due  to their  outcomes  being  less  than  fully 
anticipated,  but, on the other, the election  date is fully known.  The mag- 
nitude  of the changes  in inflation and unemployment  the model is meant 
to explain  are sufficiently  large that there should  be a large utility payoff 
to eliminating  the uncertainty  that leads to these fluctuations.  But that is 
easy  to do.  To the extent  there is a significant  effect on unemployment, 
12. Hibbs (1994) presents  such a theory of adjustment  of partisan objectives  contingent  on 
economic  outcomes  and  learning,  which  predicts  that  unemployment  and  inflation 
outcomes  across the two  parties may diverge  more in the first part of their terms than 
in the second,  though  not because  of uncertainty  about electoral outcomes.  The key to 
Hibbs's  model  of changing  objectives  (and to the  result  on time-varying  outcomes)  is 
that policymakers  are uncertain  about  the  structure  of the  economy  and  the  effects  of 
policies.  They use outcomes  to refine their beliefs  about attainable targets,  leading  to a 
feedback from outcomes  to partisan objectives  and thus policies. 92 *  DRAZEN 
old contracts should  be timed to expire and the signing  of new  contracts 
postponed  until just after an election,  so that they can reflect the election 
results.  Hence,  the main driving  force of the model  would  seem  to de- 
pend  on behavior  of workers and unions  that is less than rational, not in 
the formation of their expectations  per se, but in their labor-supply  behav- 
ior. A simple  change  in the timing  of contract behavior  would  eliminate 
the political cycle. Garfinkel and Glazer (1994) present empirical evidence 
that for labor contracts  of less  than  two  years  signed  in a presidential 
election  year, there is a clear tendency  to delay the signing  of labor con- 
tracts until after the election.13 
A  second  crucial  question  concerns  the  electoral  uncertainty  that 
drives the model.  The magnitude  of the cycle depends  on the degree  of 
electoral  uncertainty,  as well  as on the difference  in the parties'  desired 
inflation  rates.  One  problem  is that these  key driving  forces are exoge- 
nous.  Far more  troublesome  is  the  predicted  positive  correlation  be- 
tween  the  extent  of the  electoral  surprise  and  the  size  of postelectoral 
movements  in  real  economic  activity.  As  the  key  probability  qL ap- 
proaches  zero  or one,  the  magnitude  of the  fluctuations  will  approach 
zero,  with  fluctuations  being  maximal  (all else  equal)  for qL =  1. Hibbs 
(1992), among  others,  has  argued  that this prediction  is not  consistent 
with  the empirical evidence  for the United States. Consideration  of indi- 
vidual  elections  reveals  the  problem.  For example,  the  outcome  of the 
1964 presidential  election  is probably  the closest  we  have  seen  to a sure 
thing  in the postwar  era, with  Lyndon  Johnson's  victory  widely  antici- 
pated.  Yet the  rate  of  real  GNP  growth  in  the  first  two  years  of  the 
Johnson  administration  averaged  5.8% per  year,  the  highest  figure  of 
any Democratic  administration.  In contrast,  among  postwar  Republican 
victories  through  Regan's  first election,  Nixon's  victory in 1968 was  the 
closest  and  least  certain,  but  corresponds  to  the  smallest  drop  in  real 
output  in the critical second  year of the administration. 
Alesina,  Roubini,  and Cohen  (1997, Chapter  5) construct  an index  of 
electoral  surprise  for the  U.S.  presidential  elections  from  1948 to  1992, 
with Republican victories entering as negative  surprises.  They use differ- 
ent variants as an explanatory  variable in a real-GDP-growth  regression 
of the  form  (4) and  find  that the  coefficient  on  the  surprise  variable  is 
significantly  positive,  meaning  that larger Democratic  (Republican) sur- 
prises  imply higher  (lower) postelection  real growth  rates. The construc- 
13. Garfinkel  and Glazer's  results may be interpreted  in two ways. One is that postpone- 
ment of contract  signing indicates that electoral uncertainty  is important  in forming 
inflation expectations,  consistent with the basic thrust of the rational-partisan  model. 
The other is that in industries  where this is true, contract  signing is postponed, under- 
cutting the empirical  relevance  of the main driving force  of the model. The  Political  Business  Cycle  after  25 Years  *  93 
tion of the variable is complicated,  so that it is not  easy  to see  why  the 
results  of the regression  and of the simple  case study  do not agree.  The 
relation  of pre-electoral  uncertainty  and postelectoral  fluctuations  is an 
important  question  deserving  further research. 
A final question,  which  can be applied  to all the models  discussed  so 
far, is  the  central  role  assigned  to  moving  along  the  Phillips  curve  to 
reduce  unemployment  via inflation  surprises.  That is,  even  though  real 
effects  of monetary  policy  are consistent  in this approach  with  rational 
expectations,  the  reliance  on  monetary  policy  as  the  driving  force  of 
cycles  is inconsistent  with  the  evidence  on  the  important  role of fiscal 
policy  in PBCs. We return to this point  in Section 6. 
5.  Empirical  Tests  of Partisan  Models 
The  partisan  PBC has  been  tested  less  than  the  opportunistic  model. 
There is  general  agreement  on  the  existence  of partisan  effects  per se, 
especially  on economic  activity. However,  there is far less  consensus  on 
the mechanism  at work. 
5.1 ECONOMIC  ACTIVITY 
Perhaps the strongest  regularity in the U.S.  data was first pointed  out by 
Alesina  (1988), with  Faust and Irons (1999) confirming  the effect over a 
longer  time  period  using  more  sophisticated  econometric  techniques: 
For the  United  States,  real GDP  growth  is  substantially  higher  under 
Democrats  than  Republicans  in years  2 and 3 of their administrations. 
Alesina,  Roubini,  and Cohen  (1997) report that over the period from the 
first quarter of  1949 through  the  second  quarter of  1994, growth  rates 
during  Democratic  and  during  Republican  administrations  sharply  di- 
verge  starting  about  the  third quarter after the  election.  The  quarterly 
growth  rate averaged  over Democratic  administrations  rises from about 
3% per annum  in quarter 3 to about 6% per annum  by quarter 6 or 7 in 
the administration's  term of office,  and falls from the same level  to zero 
by quarter 6 or 7 in the administration's  term averaged  over Republican 
administrations.  Real GDP growth rates then improve  under Republican 
and worsen  under Democratic administrations,  so that in the fourth year 
of the administration,  the growth  performance  under  the two parties is 
identical.  Unemployment  shows  analogous  partisan  patterns  in the ex- 
pected  direction.  Alesina,  Roubini,  and Cohen  (1997) present  more for- 
mal econometric  tests  for the United  States to confirm this result,  using 
autoregressive  equations  like  (4) in quarterly  data from  1947:I through 
1993:IV with  a political  dummy  that  equals  +1  in  the  first part  of  a 
Republican  administration,  -1  in the first part of a Democratic adminis- 94 *  DRAZEN 
tration,  and  0 otherwise.  They  report  results  favorable  to  the  rational 
partisan theory for real GDP growth and for unemployment.  They find a 
significant political dummy  over the whole  life of an administration,  but 
by dividing  the  variable into first and second  halves  of the administra- 
tion, they  reject Hibbs's  version  of the partisan theory. They run similar 
tests on a sample  of 18 OECD countries  over the period  1960-1993,  also 
finding  support  for the  rational-partisan  model  and lack of support  for 
both the Hibbs and the Nordhaus  model. 
Faust and Irons (1999) find similar partisan differences  in both output 
growth  and  unemployment,  which  are strongest  in the first half of the 
term.  However,  they  find  this  partisan  difference  remains  even  after 
controlling  for observable  economic  variables  and for political effects  as 
in partisan models,  suggesting  that the data do not give  support  to any 
partisan  model.  Graphs  of  quarter-after-inauguration  effects  similar  to 
those  presented  here  may be found  for a large group  of variables.  The 
key empirical regularity on which  there is wide  agreement  is 
REGULARITY  5  There is a clear partisan effect on economic activity in  the 
United States, with economic activity being significantly higher under Demo- 
crats than Republicans  in the  first half of their terms. 
5.2 INFLATION  AND MONETARY  POLICY 
There are partisan  differences  in inflation  (as measured  by  the  rate of 
change  in the Consumer  Price Index),  though  they do not conform  sim- 
ply to the partisan theory, especially  the rational-partisan  theory. Demo- 
cratic administrations  have  lower average  inflation  than  Republican  ad- 
ministrations  in  the  first half  of their terms,  but  that inflation  is rising 
under Democrats  and falling under Republicans,  a finding reported both 
by  Alesina,  Roubini,  and  Cohen  (1997) and by  Faust and  Irons (1999). 
Hence,  the  basic  inflation  data  for the  United  States  do  not  support  a 
monetary partisan model,  whereby  the level of inflation should  be higher 
under  Democrats  than Republicans. 
In interpreting  these  results,  Alesina,  Roubini,  and Cohen  argue that 
the  differences  found  in  changes in  inflation  rates  are consistent  with 
their theory, though  the argument  is only partially convincing,  since the 
rational-partisan  theory  based  on  the  expectations-augmented  Phillips 
curve  is built  on  the  rate of inflation,  not  on  changes  in that rate. The 
econometric  tests  for inflation  cycles  in  the  United  States  are far less 
favorable  to  partisan  models,  paralleling  the  nonparametric  tests  dis- 
cussed  above.  Alesina,  Roubini,  and  Cohen  (1997) find  that after 1973 
(and the move  to floating  rates after the collapse  of Bretton Woods),  the 
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administrations  is  only  about  1.8% per  year.  They  present  no  formal 
tests  of the  timing  of inflation  within  administrations,  that is,  whether 
inflation  rates are higher in the first half of Democratic  than Republican 
administrations,  with  these  differences  narrowing  in the second  half. 
In contrast to the work of Alesina  and coauthors,  Sheffrin (1989) finds 
the  empirical  evidence  in  favor  of  the  rational-partisan  theory  to  be 
weak  for both  the  United  States  and  other  countries.  For example,  he 
argues that economic  fluctuations  following  Republican presidential  vic- 
tories  in the  United  States  are generally  inconsistent  with  the  rational- 
partisan  theory, postelectoral  recessions  often  coming  as a surprise.  He 
argues  that his weak  results  are due,  among  other things,  to the impor- 
tance  for  macroeconomic  fluctuations  of  factors  other  than  unantici- 
pated monetary  policy. Similarly, Faust and Irons (1999) find no support 
for partisan effects operating  through monetary policy. We sum up these 
disagreements  as: 
"REGULARITY"  6  There is  no consensus on  the role of monetary policy or 
inflation surprises in driving partisan effects,  with views varying widely. 
6.  From  Monetary  to Fiscal  Policy 
We have  so far considered  a number  of theoretical  and empirical issues 
raised  by  monetary  models  of  the  PBC. Each of  the  models  had  con- 
ceptual and empirical shortcomings,  some  more than others.  I think it is 
fair to say that none  of the three basic models  considered  so far receive 
overwhelming  support  in the data. This suggests  that after twenty-five 
years, monetary  surprises  as a driving force of a PBC just do not provide 
a very convincing  story. 
I considered  the  basic  opportunistic  and  partisan  model  and  the  ra- 
tional model as a group to stress this point, that is, to stress their similari- 
ties rather than their differences.  All three models  mentioned  above rely 
on a Phillips curve as the vehicle  by which  the economy  is manipulated. 
Inflation,  particularly when  it is unanticipated,  induces  movements  in 
unemployment,  as the economy  moves  up  or down  the Phillips  curve. 
Hence,  active monetary  policy is the key  drivingforce. Second,  monetary  policy 
is basically chosen by politicians according  to their desires-an  incumbent 
facing re-election in the opportunistic  models,  or a newly  elected adminis- 
tration with  specific  macroeconomic  goals  in the  partisan  models.  The 
monetary authority is subservient  to the politicians,  and in no sense  does 
it make  independent  monetary  decisions.  These  two  characteristics- 
activist  monetary  policy  (more  specifically,  monetary  surprises)  as  the 
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well  describe  either PBCs or central-bank behavior.  Countries  in which 
political  cycles  are observed  are often  countries  seen  as having  highly 
independent  central banks.  Hence,  the view  of monetary  policy  as being 
dictated by politicians  doesn't  sound  right. 
An  alternative  approach  is  that fiscal policy is  the  key  driving  force, 
especially  in pre-electoral  manipulation,  in many  countries.  Tufte (1978) 
documents  a  number  of  clear  incidents  of  pre-electoral  opportunistic 
manipulation  of  fiscal  transfers,  both  social  security  payments  and 
veterans  benefits.  Keech  and  Pak  (1989)  found  an  electoral  cycle  for 
veterans'  benefits  in the  United  States between  1961 and  1978, but ar- 
gued  that  it  had  subsequently  disappeared.  Similarly,  Alesina  (1988) 
shows  that there was  an electoral  cycle in net  transfers relative  to GNP 
over  the  period  1961 to  1985, but  that the  electoral  effect  disappears  if 
one  extends  the  sample  back  to  1949.  Alesina,  Cohen,  and  Roubini 
(1992), as well as Alesina and Roubini (1990), find evidence  for an oppor- 
tunistic cycle in transfers, though  they argue that there is no evidence  of 
a fiscal cycle for instruments  other than transfers. 
These effects  may be seen  by looking  at government  transfers to indi- 
viduals  net of social insurance  contributions  relative  to GNP (seasonally 
adjusted  and detrended),  as a function  of the quarter of the president's 
term  before,  from  1960 to  1978 in  Figure  7 and  from  1979 to  1998 in 
Figure 8. 
This evidence  on fiscal policy  suggests  a last regularity for the United 
States and other developed  countries: 
REGULARITY  7  There  is evidence  of pre-electoral  increases  in transfers  and other 
fiscal policy instruments in a number of countries. In the United States, this 
effect  appears  strongest prior to 1980. 
7. Fiscal  Cycles  in Developing  Countries 
Before considering  the  implications  of  these  regularities  in  the  United 
States for modeling  the business  cycle, it is instructive to look at develop- 
ing countries.  Recent research has found  that the fiscal cycle is especially 
strong  in developing  countries.  As  in the  United  States,  there  is much 
anecdotal  evidence  of fiscal manipulation  before elections  in other coun- 
tries. For example,  in Israel, Ben-Porath (1975) shows  convincingly  that 
opportunistic  policymaking  in  light  of  elections  was  quite  consistent 
over the period  1952-1973,  with  tax cuts implemented  before elections, 
but tax increases  only  after. Pre-electoral  fiscal manipulation  was  espe- 
cially strong  in the  1982 elections,  and Brender (1999) finds  evidence  of The  Political  Business  Cycle  after  25 Years  - 97 
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fiscal manipulation  before the most recent elections  (although  he argues 
that  it  hurt  rather  than  helped  the  incumbents).  Krueger  and  Turan 
(1993) argue that pre-electoral  fiscal manipulation  was  common  in Tur- 
key in the period 1950-1980.  Pre-electoral fiscal manipulation  is common 
in Latin America,  the increase in the quasifiscal  deficit in Mexico before 
the  1994 elections  being  but  one  of many  examples.  [Gonzalez  (1999b) 
shows  the  existence  of  an  electoral  cycle  in  government  spending  in 
Mexico over the period 1958-1997  in both presidential  and congressional 
elections.]  Several studies  have  found  significant  pre-electoral  increases 
in public spending  in India before elections. 





o 98 *  DRAZEN 
panel study  of 17 Latin American  countries  in which  he shows  that over 
the period 1947-1982,  government  expenditures  increased by 6.3% in the 
pre-election  year  and  decreased  by  7.6% in the  year after the  election. 
Block (2000) presents  evidence  of a political business  cycle in both  fiscal 
and monetary  policy  in a cross section  of 44 sub-Saharan African coun- 
tries. Schuknecht  (1996) is probably the first comprehensive  study  of the 
political business  cycle in 35 developing  countries  over the period  1970- 
1992.  He  argues  that  there  should  be  more  room  for manipulation  in 
developing  countries,  as checks and balances  are weaker and the incum- 
bent has more power  over monetary  and fiscal policy. He argues that in 
developing  countries  expenditure  policies  (such as distribution  of free or 
subsidized  goods  or employment  generation  via public works programs) 
are probably more effective  than tax cuts in affecting voter behavior.  He 
uses a political dummy  which is positive  in the year of elections,  negative 
in  the  year  after, and  zero  otherwise  in fiscal  deficit  and  output  auto- 
regressions  such as (4) and finds a clear, significant  effect of elections  on 
the fiscal balance, but no significant  effect on output. 
Gonzalez  (1999a)  and  Shi  and  Svensson  (2000)  extend  the  Rogoff 
(1990) model  of political budget  cycles to study the effect of the degree of 
democracy  on  the  magnitude  of  fiscal  cycles.  Gonzalez  considers  the 
fiscal  model  set  out  in  a subsequent  section  (but without  a monetary 
sector),  including  two  further  variables:  the  cost  of  removing  a  pol- 
icymaker from office (the degree  of democracy),  and transparency,  meaning 
the probability that voters  learn the incumbent's  competence  costlessly, 
that is, independent  of signaling.  She finds that with a high enough  cost 
of removing  officeholders,  incumbents  will not be removed  from office 
and will follow  their full-information  optimal policy. An electoral budget 
cycle emerges  only  if removing  a politician  from office is not too costly. 
Transparency also has intuitive  effects: the higher the degree of transpar- 
ency, the smaller the amount of distortion  away from the first best in the 
political budget  cycle.  Interestingly,  when  there is a positive  correlation 
between  the  degree  of  democracy  and  transparency,  political  budget 
cycles arise only where both measures  are at intermediate  levels.  Shi and 
Svensson  include  a similar measure  of transparency in a Rogoff political- 
budget-cycle  model,  but where  government  spending  is chosen  before 
the government  learns its competence,  so that no signaling  occurs.  (See 
their footnote  9.) 
Gonzalez  (1999b) considers  the  relation between  the  level  of democ- 
racy and  the  strength  of the  political  cycle  in a sample  of 43 countries 
over the period  1950-1997  and finds  that the cycle is strongest  in coun- 
tries  with  intermediate  levels  of  democracy.  Shi  and  Svensson  (2000) 
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oping  countries  over  the period  1975-1995  and similarly  include  an in- 
dex of democracy.  They also find that a fiscal political business  cycle is 
especially  strong in developing  countries. 
8. An Initial  Summing  Up 
The  argument  presented  so  far is twofold.  First, both  empirically  and 
theoretically,  a monetary-based  PBC model-either  of manipulation  of 
aggregate  economic  activity via monetary surprises before an election,  or 
of partisan  effects  after an election-is  less  than  fully  convincing.  Sec- 
ond,  there appears to be a strong role for fiscal policy in many countries, 
including  the United States in certain time periods.  This suggests  basing 
PBC models  on  fiscal  rather than  monetary  policy.  Conceptually,  this 
solves  some  basic problems  for which  monetary  PBC models  have been 
criticized. Fiscal policy has real effects on economic  activity even if antici- 
pated.  Moreover, it can affect voting behavior even  if there are no aggre- 
gate effects.  Since monetary  policy is not the driving force, one need  not 
assume  that the incumbent  controls  monetary  policy. 
However,  basing a PBC model,  or at least an opportunistic  PBC model, 
on manipulation  of fiscal policy raises two key questions.  First, how can the 
monetary  effects  that are observed  be  made  consistent with a PBC driven byfiscal 
policy? This question  has at least two aspects: first, on a conceptual  level, 
what  is the role of an independent  central bank in a fiscal induced  PBC, 
and,  on an empirical level,  how  can we  reconcile  the cycle in monetary 
aggregates  that  often  does  appear  before  an election?  Second,  why do 
rational  voters respond  to pre-electoral  manipulation?  We consider these ques- 
tions in turn. 
The  key  to the  monetary  effects  is that,  as Woolley  (1984) and  Beck 
(1987) have  argued,  an  independent  central  bank  may  be  willing  to 
accommodate  the executive  branch's pressures  for monetary  policy dur- 
ing election  years in order to prevent  sharp movements  in interest rates. 
They do so in order to avoid any appearance  of interfering politically  in 
the election  process.  Woolley, who  has  studied  the political  relation be- 
tween  the  U.S.  president  and  the  Federal  Reserve  more  than  anyone 
else,  puts it as follows  (1984, p.  127): 
Sherman  Maisel  wrote that "Federal  Reserve  policy has always been to avoid, 
if possible, taking any major monetary actions as elections approach."  This 
conclusion was echoed in several interviews with Federal Reserve officials. 
As Governor  Partee  put it, "if  you were to ask a central  banker  about what he 
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have stability." Stability in interest rates and the money  supply  would  presum- 
ably keep  the central bank from being  dragged  into partisan politics. 
The  Fed  is not  so much  interested  in pushing  the  re-election  of the  incum- 
bent  as  in  simply  "lying  low"  during  the  election  so  as  not  to  be  subse- 
quently  criticized.14 
The  role  of  monetary  policy  in  a political  cycle  is  more  probably  pas- 
sive  rather  than  active,  accommodating  fiscal  stimuli  that  opportunistic 
policymakers  may  employ  to  affect  election  outcomes.  This  distinction 
follows  Beck  (1987),  who,  as  pointed  out  above,  argued  that  there  is  a 
political  cycle  in  the  money  supply  in  the  United  States,  but  no  cycle  in 
monetary  instruments,  such  as  reserves  or  the  federal  funds  rate.  The 
reason  is  that  the  Federal  Reserve  accommodates  fiscal  policy  in  an 
election  year,  so  that  there  is a passive  political  monetary  cycle  caused  by 
a political  cycle  in  fiscal  instruments,  but  the  Fed  does  not  actively  in- 
duce  a political  cycle.15 
Why  do  voters  respond  to  pre-electoral  manipulation  if  they  are  ra- 
tional?  The  basic  argument,  first  formalized  by  Rogoff  (1990)  and  Rogoff 
and  Sibert  (1988),  is  that  the  enactment  of  policies  that  appear  to  be 
opportunistically  short-sighted  and  the  influence  they  have  on  voters 
may  be  due  to a signaling  effect:  voters  have  imperfect  information  about 
relevant  characteristics  of potential  policymakers,  and  what  appear  to be 
gimmicks  have  an  effect  because  they  are  taken  to  provide  relevant 
information  about  candidates  for  office.  Specifically,  a government  sig- 
nals  its  "type"  by  taking  actions  that  worsen  the  budget  situation  with 
the  notion  that  only  someone  who  is very  competent  would  put  himself 
in  that  situation. 
One  criticism  that  has  been  raised  of this  approach  is that  it is the  most 
competent  who  distort  the  economy,  a result  seen  as unrealistic.  A better 
14. Both Beck and Woolley argue that the easy monetary  stance of the Fed under Arthur 
Burs  in the 1972 presidential  election was due to something more complicated  than 
giving Nixon the expansionary  monetary  policy he wanted to ensure his re-election.  It 
must be seen against  the backdrop  of wage-price controls  instituted  the previous year. 
In October  1971,  as part  of Phase II, the White  House asked Congress  for the authority 
to control interest rates and corporate  dividends, but to forgo use of the authority  for 
the time being. This led to the formation  of the Committee  on Interest  and Dividends 
(CID),  of which Burns  was chairman,  responsible  for monitoring  interest  rates. Burns 
was dead set against interest-rate  controls,  but aware of the political  pressure for their 
imposition. He was therefore especially concerned about letting interest rates rise 
during 1972, and, according to Woolley, communicated  to the FOMC his concerns 
about  the political  pressures  for administrative  controls  that rising interest  rates  would 
induce. See Woolley  (1984,  Chapter  8). 
15. Beck  argues that this accommodation  is why the monetary  cycle that  both he and Grier 
(1989)  find peaks in the election quarter  itself, when the monetary  expansion  shouldn't 
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way  to view  this  approach,  in my  opinion,  is that a more  "competent" 
policymaker  can expand  government  spending  or reduce  taxes and still 
not  induce  the  distortion  that  a less  "competent"  policymaker  would 
induce. 
9.  The  Active-Fiscal,  Passive-Monetary  Model 
We now  present  a model  of the PBC illustrating  the approach suggested 
in  the  previous  section.  The  fiscal  side  of  the  model  follows  Rogoff's 
(1990) model  of political  budget  cycles,  with  an incumbent  using  fiscal 
policy to help his re-election  prospects.  Monetary policy  is controlled by 
a  separate  monetary  authority,  which  may  nonetheless  accommodate 
fiscal expansion.  On  a conceptual  level  the model  differs  from existing 
models  in that political  cycles reflect not a single  authority  that controls 
all macroeconomic  policy, but elected officials who  influence  fiscal policy 
and  an independent  monetary  authority  that controls  monetary  policy. 
The political cycle reflects the interaction of these  separate  forces. 
9.1 VOTERS 
Voters are heterogeneous  in two  dimensions.  First, the  utility  of every 
voter depends  on aggregate  economic  variables, with this effect given by 
a loss function  such as (2). Voters differ in the relative weight  they assign 
to  output  fluctuations,  the  coefficient  a  in  equation  (2), but  have  the 
same  targets  for x and  7r. Second,  the  utility  of  a subset  of  voters  is 
affected  by  some  government-provided  public  goods,  which  are con- 
trolled by the incumbent  president,  and  all such  voters  place  the same 
utility value on public goods.  (These play the role of targeted transfers to 
specific  constituencies.)  Since  the  incumbent  does  not  control  macro- 
economic  aggregates  on his own  (in fact, they are more influenced  by the 
monetary  authority),  only  those  voters  who  receive  public  goods  will 
have  a preference  over candidates.16 
The implicit assumption  of heterogeneous  voters  is made  to highlight 
three  issues  crucial to a fiscal model  of the  PBC and to PBC models  in 
general.  First, heterogeneity  of  the  population  means  that  we  cannot 
think  of  a policymaker  as maximizing  the  utility  of  a "representative" 
agent.  This  insight  formed  the  basis  of  partisan  models  and  is  more 
general.  As  I argue  in Drazen  (2000a), heterogeneity  of interests  is the 
16. This  structure  is  a much  simplified  version  of  the  Dixit-Londregan  (1996) model  of 
targeted  transfers in which  voters  differ in the relative  weights  they  put  on transfers 
and  policy  preferences,  with  those  most  susceptible  to  transfers  being  targeted  by 
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central concept  of political economy. 
17 Second,  transfers can be targeted 
to specific  groups,  so that there can be a significant  effect on voting  as a 
result of fiscal manipulation  without  there necessarily  being  an effect on 
aggregate  economic  activity. Third, whether  any fiscal electoral cycle has 
aggregate  effects  will depend,  among  other things,  on the possible  size 
of politically  motivated  fiscal expenditures  relative  to the economy  as a 
whole.  (It will  also  depend  on  the  strength  of the  monetary  authority 
relative to elected  politicians.) 
More specifically, there are two government-produced  goods: g, a pub- 
lic consumption  good  (measured  in  per  voter  terms),  and  k, a public 
investment  good.  In any period,  the utility of a voter i who  is affected by 
public-good  provision  may be written: 
U1(xt,  t, gt,)=  -  (a 
+  +  g  +  v(kt),  (10) 
where  >- 0, Xr  2  0, and v(-) is an increasing  concave  function  satisfying 
the  Inada  conditions.  A  voter  of  type  i who  is  not  affected  by  public 
goods  has  a utility  function  only  containing  the  first expression  on  the 
right-hand  side  of  (10).  There  are  two  periods,  so  that  the  expected 
utility of voter i over his horizon  is 
E(nl)  =E(  3t lU-)),  ( 1) 
where  3 <  1 is the voter's  discount  rate.18 
9.2 AGGREGATE  SUPPLY  OF AND DEMAND  FOR  GOODS 
The aggregate  output  gap xt and inflation  rt are related by an aggregate 
supply  relation as in (1), but with  a stochastic  element: 
Xt =  Tt -  Ett+l  +  St,  (12) 
where  si is a supply  shock described by st = pst_  + ^t,  with 0 -  p < 1, and 
where  gt is an i.i.d.  mean-zero  random  variable.  Note  the  difference  in 
17. In Rogoff's (1990)  paper, the key conflict  of interest  is between a voter who maximizes 
his utility and a politician  who cares about social welfare  but has the additional  objec- 
tive of staying in office. See equation (17)  below. 
18. As in Rogoff (1990),  there may also be a nonpecuniary,  leader-specific  shock. Its role 
here would be to ensure that in a pooling equilibrium  in which policy gives no informa- 
tion about  competence,  an incumbent  is not  elected with certainty.  This  is important  for 
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the expected  inflation term from (1), where  it is expected  future inflation, 
rather  than  current  inflation,  that  enters.  This  change  is  to  make  the 
monetary  side of the model  consistent  with  recent work on interest-rate 
rules,  as in  Clarida,  Gali,  and  Gertler (1999). This change  is of crucial 
importance  in how  one  interprets  the Phillips  curve  (see  Clarida, Gali, 
and  Gertler, 1999), but has  no  qualitative  effect on  our basic argument 
about the interaction of the fiscal and monetary  authorities.  It is assumed 
that prices  are sticky in the short run, which  allows  monetary  policy  to 
have  short-run effects. 
Output  consists  of public  goods  determined  by the incumbent  politi- 
cian  (as explained  below)  and  all other  goods;  as shorthand,  we  term 
nonpolitical  goods  those  that the politician cannot determine  directly. The 
supply  of public consumption  goods  is given  by 
gt =  -  kt+l,  (13) 
where  E is  the  competence  of  the  President  currently  in  office.  A  more 
competent  leader is a better economic  manager,  able to increase a coun- 
try's level  of output.  Competence  is  a given  characteristic  of a leader, 
which  in this two-period  setup  is equivalent  to the  first-order moving- 
average  structure  assumed  by  Rogoff.  Leaders  are of  two  types:  high 
competence  (EH)  and  low  competence  (EL  <  EH).  Competence  E is not 
observed  by the voters; in the absence  of any information,  they assign  a 
probability 0 <  y <  1 to a leader being  of high  competence,  where  e  = 
YEH +  (1  -  y)EL. 
The public-goods  constraint is written in this way to highlight  the fact 
that  for public  capital  to  be  purchased  in  period  t+1,  funds  must  be 
allocated in period t.19  Hence,  though  the decision  on public investment 
is made  at t, it only  enters aggregate  demand  in t+ 1. Moreover,  though 
kt+l  is chosen  in period  t, it is only observed  in period  t+1. 
Following  the monetary-policy  literature, we  assume  that demand  for 
nonpolitical  goods  (relative to potential  output)  is a decreasing  function 
of the ex ante real interest rate with a stochastic term z, that is, it is X(it - 
EtTt+l)  +  Zt. We may  then  write  the  output  gap  as  a function  of  the 
interest rate (the "IS curve"): 
Xt =  X(it  -  Et,Tt+l) +  k,t-  +  gt +  Zt -  E.  (14) 
In deriving  the monetary authority's interest-rate rule, we will consider a 
linear version  of (14): 
19. Multiplying  k,i+  by one plus the real  interest  rate to represent  the cost of carry  does not 
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t =  -9(it  -  Et-t+l)  +  qtt  (15) 
where  p >  0 and  t =  kt-,  +  gt +  zt -  E. 
9.3 THE  PRESIDENT  AND FISCAL  POLICY 
It is assumed  that the incumbent  president  controls the determination  of 
public  (that is,  political)  goods  g and  k. The president  cares about  the 
social welfare of all voters.  Given the form of the utility function  (10) and 
the  fact  that  voters  don't  hold  the  president  directly  accountable  for 
macroeconomic  performance,  the  single-period  voter  welfare  measure 
he maximizes  is the sum of (negative)  macroeconomic  loss over all voters 
plus  g  +  v(k) multiplied  by  the  fraction  of voters  who  are affected  by 
public-good  supply.  This objective may be written as 
(x  -  -)2  Tt(77 
- 
Tr)2 
Uv(.)  =  -  +  2  -)  +n[g  +  v(kt)],  (16) 
where  a is the average value  of a' over the electorate and 0 <  n <  1 is the 
fraction of voters  affected by provision  of political goods. 
The  incumbent  has  two  additional  arguments  in his  objective  func- 
tion.  First,  as in  Rogoff,  he  attaches  a value  to being  in  office  per  se, 
which  we  denote  by  O. Second,  he  may  try  to  influence  the  central 
bank's  choice  of  monetary  policy;  specifically,  consistent  with  the  dis- 
cussion  in the previous  section,  an incumbent  may press  the monetary 
authority  to keep  interest  rates low  in an election  year,  which  he  may 
value  for  re-election  purposes  or  to  satisfy  important  constituencies. 
Here,  the  second  is  modeled  loosely  by  assuming  that  voters  value 
economic  activity more highly  than the monetary  authority [see equation 
(18) below],  which  is therefore important to the incumbent  in an election 
year. However,  applying  pressure  has a cost independent  of its effect on 
interest  rates  or  other  observable  variables.  This  cost  may  reflect  the 
psychic  costs to the executive  of tension  with  the monetary  authority or, 
more likely, the cost of reduced cooperation  from the monetary authority 
in the  future.  The cost  depends  on the whole  nature  of the interaction 
between  the monetary  authority and the elected president,  including  the 
ability of the monetary  authority to withstand  such pressures.  For now, 
we  simply  write the cost of such  pressure  as 4, where  ; is increasing  in 
the amount  of pressure  applied. 
An incumbent's  expected  utility may then be written 
2 
fP  = Ef2  +  3t-lqt(  -  ),  (17) 
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where  qt is the  probability  of being  in  office  in period  t, and  Qv is ob- 
tained  from  UV in  (16) via  (11).  For an  incumbent,  q,  =  1; q2 will  be 
derived below.  Equation (17) makes clear that since an incumbent  places 
a value  on being in office, he will be opportunistic  and try to manipulate 
the economy  to improve  his re-election  chances,  but there are limits on 
how  far he is willing  to go. 
In our model  manipulation  takes  two  forms.  First, and  most  impor- 
tantly, there is direct manipulation  via fiscal policy  (choice of g), where 
concern  for social  welfare  puts  a limit on  the  degree  of manipulation. 
Second,  he may put pressure  on the central bank to lower interest rates, 
but there are costs  of doing  so,  as summarized  by  I. For simplicity, it is 
assumed  that  the  incumbent  knows  that  fiscal  policy  affects  interest 
rates  but  does  not  know  exactly  how  the  monetary  authority  will  re- 
spond  and therefore does not take into account the effect of g on interest 
rates in choosing  his preferred value.  This assumption,  which  simplifies 
the mathematical  analysis,  seems  realistic and has no substantive  effect 
on the nature of the results. 
9.4 ELECTORAL  STRUCTURE 
The electoral  structure is as follows.  For simplicity,  there  are only  two 
periods,  with  an election  at the end of the first period.  In the first period 
the incumbent  observes  E  and chooses  g, and k2.  Voters observe g, and il 
(but not  E or k2)  and use  these  observations  to form an inference  about 
competence.  Based  on  their beliefs  about  competence,  they  then  vote 
whether  to  retain  the  incumbent  or replace  him  with  a challenger  of 
unknown  competence,  so  that  the  expected  competence  of  the  chal- 
lenger is e. More specifically, the voters choose  to retain the incumbent  if 
expected  utility  under  the  incumbent  is  higher  than  expected  utility 
under  the  challenger.20 In  the  second  period,  the  elected  president 
chooses  his first-best policy, as there is no election. 
9.5 THE  MONETARY  AUTHORITY 
We assume  that the central bank's objective function  can be represented 
by the loss  function  (2) (which  also represents  the loss  that individuals 
20. An alternative assumption  is that the incumbent  chooses  g, before  E  is observed,  so there 
is no  signaling  of type.  Suppose  that output,  which  is observed  by  voters  before  an 
election,  is the  sum  of competence  e and  a random  shock,  both  unobserved.  Hence, 
when  a high  level  of output  is observed,  optimal  inference  would  lead voters  to raise 
the  probability  that the  incumbent  is of high  competence,  and  therefore  make  them 
more likely to vote  to re-elect him.  Incumbents,  knowing  this,  are induced  to increase 
government  expenditures  before  an  election.  One  would  therefore  obtain  a  pre- 
electoral fiscal cycle, with  all competence  types  raising spending  before an election  and 
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assign  to aggregate  fluctuations)  but that the coefficient on output devia- 
tions or the target levels  for the output  gap and inflation need  not be the 
same as the public's.  Specifically, let the central bank's single-period  loss 
function  be 
CB  (Xt 
- 
X)2  (7t  -  i7r)2  (18) 
2  2 
where  or  <  &, that is,  the  monetary  authority  assigns  a greater cost  to 
inflation  fluctuations  than the  "average" voter,  as well  as possibly  hav- 
ing lower  targets for output  and inflation.  Though  there is considerable 
research  aimed  at deriving  the  central bank's  objective  from the  utility 
function  of the representative  agent,  the whole  concept of a policymaker 
maximizing  the  utility  of  a representative  agent  misses  the  essence  of 
political-economy  models.  Furthermore,  using  a loss  function  such  as 
(18) follows  both the PBC literature and the literature on monetary policy 
rules  [see,  for example,  Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) and the discus- 
sion  therein],  making it easier to compare  results from those  literatures. 
The monetary  authority chooses  xt and  rt to minimize  its loss function 
subject  to  the  aggregate  supply  relation  (12) and  the  shocks  st and  qt. 
(See  the  appendix  for  a  derivation  of  optimal  policy  as  well  as  the 
interest-rate rule.)  By maximizing  (18) subject to (12), and using  (15) to 
derive  the  nominal  interest  rate,  one  obtains  the  monetary  authority's 
optimal  interest-rate rule: 
/  1\  1 
it  =  l1  +  )  E,7T-1+-  7t,  (19) 
where  Et 't+l = pst  and it is assumed  that this rule will be followed  in the 
future.  This  rule  gives  the  first-best  response  to  supply  shocks  st and 
demand  shocks  7t.21 We consider below  how pressure from the executive 
may  force the  monetary  authority  to follow  a different  rule implying  a 
smaller interest-rate response  to shocks. 
To close  the  monetary  sector,  the  money-supply  growth  rate consis- 
tent with  the interest-rate  target is given  by the money-market  equilib- 
rium condition  (the LM curve) when  the price level  is sticky in the short 
run. In the absence  of money  demand  shocks,  we  obtain a simple  rela- 
tion between  money  growth  and interest rates, namely, 
21. As Clarida,  Gali,  and Gertler  (2000)  point out, this rule is consistent  with the Taylor  rule 
when lagged inflation  or a linear  combination  of lagged inflation  and the output gap is 
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At = M(it, xt)  (20) 
where,  given  xt, the money  growth  rate will be an increasing  function  of 
the interest  rate. We assume  that the money-supply  growth  rate is con- 
temporaneously  unobserved  by voters.  This prevents  them  from using 
interest  rates  and  monetary  growth  rates together  to  infer the  compe- 
tence  of the president. 
9.6 EQUILIBRIUM  FISCAL  AND MONETARY  POLICY  UNDER 
FULL  INFORMATION 
We begin  with  the benchmark  full-information  equilibrium,  where  vot- 
ers can observe  E  before voting.  If E is observed,  pre-electoral fiscal policy 
can have no effect on the election  outcome.  Taking q2  as given in (17), the 
incumbent's  decision  problem over gt and kt  becomes  equivalent  to maxi- 
mizing  the voters' utility  UV. Using  the simplifying  assumption  that the 
president  does  not  take into  account  the  effect  of g on  interest  rates in 
choosing  his preferred value,  one obtains a first-order condition: 
svv'(k)  2  1,  (21) 
with  equality  if E -  (v')-1 (1/13).  If E  is sufficiently  large, then both public 
goods  are supplied  and (21) holds  as an equality. We assume  that EL (and 
hence  EH)  is  high  enough  that  this  is  the  case.  First-best  government 
investment  and consumption  are then 
k  =  (v)(-)  (1/3),  g*(E)  =  Ej -  k*,  (22) 
for j = L, H. This is the policy always  chosen  in the second  period (when 
there is no election),  and it is the policy  chosen  in the first period under 
full  information.  Clearly, g* is  increasing  in  E, so  that  voter  utility  is 
increasing  in e as well. 
To find monetary  policy  in a nonelection  year (or under  full informa- 
tion),  we  assume  that the monetary  authority knows  (22), that is, that it 
knows  that  there  is  no  electoral  manipulation  in  a  nonelection  year. 
Combining  (22) with  (19) and  (20), one  finds  that the  interest  rate and 
money  growth  rate will be  the  same  under  low-  and high-competence 
policymakers  in  nonelection  years,  depending  only  on  aggregate  de- 
mand  and supply  shocks. 
9.7 FISCAL  POLICY  UNDER  ASYMMETRIC  INFORMATION 
We now  consider  the incumbent  politician's  decision  problem  when  his 
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erally a multiplicity  of equilibria, both  separating  and pooling.  We con- 
sider only pure strategies, and assume that voters are sufficiently  sophisti- 
cated that they rule out incumbents  following  dominated  strategies.  This 
leaves  only one separating equilibrium,  on which we focus.22 (Of course, 
the welfare the low-competence  type gets in a pooling  equilibrium will be 
important in deriving the separating equilibrium.) We show that in a sepa- 
rating  equilibrium,  the  low-competence  type  chooses  his  full-informa- 
tion,  first-best solution,  while  the high-competence  type signals  his type 
by choosing  public consumption  g higher  than the full-information  opti- 
mum  (at the expense  of low public investment,  which  is contemporane- 
ously  unobserved).  The effect on interest rates depends  on the choice  of 
gt, which is perceived  by the central bank as a demand  shock,  and on the 
pressure the president  is able to put on the monetary authority. High pre- 
electoral  government  consumption  combined  with  effective  pressure  on 
the  monetary  authority  will be seen  in high  money  growth  rates,  even 
though  it has no causative  effect on the pre-electoral  expansion. 
Under asymmetric  information,  voters' beliefs  about competence  are a 
function  of the observed  fiscal policy. (The level of interest rates will give 
no  additional  information,  given  the  unobservability  of  the  money 
growth rate.) We represent  these beliefs as f(g), which  is the probability a 
voter assigns to the incumbent being of high competence,  given the obser- 
vation of fiscal policy. These beliefs in turn determine  the probability that 
an incumbent  is re-elected.  Given  Equation (19), interest rates are deter- 
mined by g and the incumbent's  type as given above, so that we may write 
the incumbent's  expected  utility as a function of his chosen  policy and his 
type as Qf(g,  (g),E). 
To derive  the equilibrium,  we  work backwards.  In the second  period, 
both  competence  types  choose  the  fiscal policy  according  to  (22), with 
government  consumption  g being higher under a high-competence  than 
a low-competence  type.  Given  the  first-best  fiscal  solution,  the  central 
bank can meet both of its monetary  targets. Voters will therefore always 
re-elect an incumbent  they believe  to be of high competence  [q2('  = 1) = 
1] and  vote  to remove  an incumbent  they  believe  to be  of low  compe- 
tence  [q2(j =  0)  =  0].  When  there  is no  information  about  the  compe- 
tence  of  the  incumbent  (for example,  in  a pooling  equilibrium  where 
both types  chose  the same  policy),  so that the incumbent  is assumed  to 
be of average  competence  y, it is assumed  that the probability that he is 
re-elected  is  positive,  but  less  than  one  [0  <  q2(y/  =  y)  <  1],  for  the 
reasons  discussed  in footnote  18 above. 
22. In this  sort  of  model,  pooling  equilibria  are generally  ruled  out  by  the  Cho-Kreps 
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In the first period  in a separating  equilibrium,  a low-competence  type 
chooses  his full-information optimum,  since he gains nothing  from choos- 
ing a distortionary public-expenditure  combination  that yields less utility 
but still allows  voters to deduce  his type.  A high-competence  type must 
therefore  choose  a policy  that the low-competence  type  chooses  not  to 
mimic. More specifically,  denote  the policy  of the high-competence  type 
in a separating  equilibrium  by  gH,  with  an associated  nominal  interest 
rate. In order for the low-competence  type not to mimic the high-compe- 
tence  type,  he  must  receive  lower  utility  from  mimicking  the  high- 
competence  type than from revealing himself.  (In the case of equal utility, 
we  assume  that the low-competence  type chooses  to reveal himself.)  We 
thus require in a separating equilibrium  that 
f2P(gH,  (gH) =  y;EL) ?  fP(g*  (L),0;EL).  (23) 
That is, in a separating  equilibrium,  gH (and the associated  interest rate) 
is such  that a low-competence  incumbent  would  rather choose  the full- 
information  solution  and be revealed  (and hence  defeated  for sure) than 
choose  to  mimic  the  spending  level  gH with  the  implied  low  level  of 
public  investment.  In such  a pooling  equilibrium  the  low-competence 
type  must  put  enough  pressure  on  the  central bank  to hit the  interest 
rate iH that the high-competence  type  achieves,  which  is possible  if the 
monetary  authority chooses  a high enough  (unobserved)  money  growth 
rate. That is, the high-competence  type must choose  a high enough  level 
of gH that the low-competence  type chooses  not to mimic. 
One  possibility  is  that  the  high-competence  type's  full-information 
level  of  expenditure,  namely  g*(EH),  satisfies  (23).  That  is,  the  high- 
competence  type  can separate  himself  by  choosing  his  first-best point, 
because  it is  such  that  the  low-competence  will  not  find  it optimal  to 
adopt  it. This would  be the case,  for example  if the value  0  of being  in 
office were low. In that case the distortion  that a low-competence  incum- 
bent  would  have  to  undertake  to  match  the  high-competence  type's 
nondistortionary  solution  would  not justify  the  (low)  value  of winning 
reelection.  Another  case in which  g*(EH)  would  be a separating  equilib- 
rium  is where  the  difference  between  EH and  EL is very  large,  since  it 
would  be  too  costly  for  the  low-competence  type  to  adopt  the  high- 
competence  type's  first-best policy. 
When g*(EH)  does not satisfy (23), then the high-competence  type must 
choose  a point  which  gives  him less  utility than g*(EH)  in order to sepa- 
rate himself.  Since the cost to the high-competence  type of signaling  his 
type is higher for higher gH relative to g*, he will choose  the lowest  level 
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strategy.)  This value  is given  by  the  value  of gH that satisfies  (23) with 
equality. 
A further condition  for a separating  equilibrium  is that gH must  give 
the high-competence  type  utility no lower  than the full-information  ex- 
penditure  level g*(EH)  gives  him,  that is, 
Q/(gH,1;EH) _ fP(g*(eH),  (g*(EH))  =  y;EH).  (24) 
A separating equilibrium  must satisfy both (23) and (24). One may show 
that since  EH  >  EL and  v(-) is concave,  a separating  equilibrium  exists. 
(See Drazen,  2000b.)  In such  an equilibrium,  the  low-competence  type 
chooses  g*(eL), his full-information  first-best level  of expenditure,  while 
a  high-competence  type  chooses  a  level  of  expenditure  gH just  high 
enough  that the low-competence  type  does  not find it optimal  to adopt 
that policy  instead  of his first-best policy. 
More realistically, there will be many different competence  types,  with 
all but  the  least  competent  choosing  a level  of  expenditure  above  his 
first-best optimum  to signal his competence  level.  [See Rogoff and Sibert 
(1988) for the derivation  of this type  of equilibrium  with a continuum  of 
competence  types.]  Hence,  some  degree  of pre-electoral manipulation  of 
fiscal policy will be the rule rather than the exception. 
We may then summarize  the characteristics of the political fiscal cycle. 
Before an election,  a high  level  of spending  signals  an high-competence 
incumbent,  so that a high level of spending  leads the incumbent  to be re- 
elected  by  rational  voters.  This  high  level  of  spending  may  be  either 
nondistortionary  [if g*(EH)  satisfies  (23)] or distortionary  (if it does  not). 
When  the  optimal  signal  is distortionary,  the central bank will  partially 
accommodate  high  government  spending  to restrain the impact of fiscal 
expansion  on  interest  rates.  Hence,  money  growth  will  rise before  an 
election,  not to affect economic  activity directly, but in response  to expan- 
sionary fiscal policy. 
9.8 MONETARY  POLICY  IN AN ELECTION  PERIOD 
In a nonelection  period  all competence  types  choose  fiscal policy accord- 
ing to (22), so the demand  stimulus  is independent  of competence;  and, 
as was  argued  above,  the monetary  authority's  preferred monetary  pol- 
icy, as determined  by (19), is independent  of competence  as well.  More- 
over, there is no reason  for a politician  to put pressure  on the monetary 
authority  for electoral purposes.  In contrast,  neither  of these  conditions 
need  hold  in an electoral period. 
As  argued  in  the  previous  section,  in  an  election  period,  the  high- 
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many types)  will choose  to signal,  and this may require choosing  a level 
of public consumption  gl above the first-best optimum.  If there are many 
competence  types  with  two  adjoining  types  having  values  of  E not  far 
from one another, then signaling  will almost certainly require increasing 
g, above the level  given  in (22). 
How  will the monetary  authority  react? In the absence  of any knowl- 
edge of the president's  competence,  an increase in g in an election period 
is  seen  simply  as  a demand  shock  t,  which  the  monetary  authority 
would  want to offset by increasing the nominal  interest rate according to 
(19). However,  when  the  "average" voter  prefers  higher  and  less  vari- 
able output  than the monetary  authority,  an incumbent  president  gains 
votes  by  limiting  the  increase  in  the  interest  rate,  implying  that  the 
equilibrium  output  gap  is below  what  the  monetary  authority  prefers. 
Note  that this is true even  if the president  shares the monetary  author- 
ity's  preferences  over  aggregate  variables  in (18), as long  as the  voters 
have  different preferences. 
To make this precise,  one has to specify  how  much pressure  the presi- 
dent  puts  on  the  monetary  authority  and  how  this  is  translated  into 
limitations  on interest rate. There are several ways  of modeling  this. For 
simplicity,  suppose  that the intervention  takes the form of inducing  the 
monetary  authority  to  reduce  proportionally  the  response  to  demand 
shocks  (which  means  accommodating  the fiscal stimulus  of the incum- 
bent,  among  other  things),  that  is,  to  choose  the  interest  rate in  the 
election  period  according to 
/  1\  1 
it =  T1  +  )  Etrt+  +  (1 -  w)-  ,  (25) 
\  pcr(p/  (, 
for 0 -  w -  1 chosen  by the incumbent  president.23 The higher w is, the 
greater is the incumbent's  cost  t. An incumbent  will choose  w optimally 
depending  on the nature of the cost of pressure  relative to the weight  he 
puts  on  voters'  welfare  Qv.  Interest-rate  intervention  will  limit  the  in- 
crease  in interest  rates in response  to fiscal shocks  and  hence  increase 
output  above  what  the  monetary  authority  prefers,  which  is preferred 
by the voters.  The aggregate  effect of this will depend  on the size of the 
fiscal stimulus.  If it is targeted  to a narrow group  of voters  (that is, if n, 
the fraction of voters who  are affected by higher g, is small) or if the size 
23. From the monetary authority's optimization  problem,  it is clear that even with interven- 
tion,  conditions  (A2) and (A3) in the appendix  still hold.  Since the monetary  authority 
expects  to be allowed  to follow  the first-best rule in period 2, (25) gives  the response  of 
interest  rates to shocks  when  the monetary  authority knows  that its reaction is limited 
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of the fiscal stimulus  is small relative to the economy,  there will be little 
or no aggregate  effect. If it is large, as in some  of the developed-country 
cases discussed  in Section 8, there may be a large aggregate  effect. 
The effect  on money  growth  rates is obvious.  The more pressure  the 
incumbent  puts  on  the  monetary  authority  to keep  interest  rates from 
rising,  the  higher  must  be money  growth  relative  to the  monetary  au- 
thorities'  first-best.  In the case of w =  1, interest rates don't rise at all in 
response  to  a fiscal  stimulus,  so  that  the  money  growth  rate must  in- 
crease before  the election.  Of course,  this depends  on the existence  of a 
fiscal stimulus.  In its absence,  there is no higher-than-average  pressure 
on  interest  rates and hence  no need  for a monetary  accommodation  of 
the politically  induced  fiscal stimulus.  The possibility  of accommodation 
in  response  to  pressure,  its  implications  for  monetary  policy,  and  its 
connection  with  the  fiscal  stimulus  contain  the  essence  of  the  AFPM 
model  of the PBC. 
10. A Look  at the  Data  and  Some  Concluding  Comments 
We now  take  a quick  look  at the  data  to  show  that  they  are broadly 
consistent  with  the  model.  A  clear difference  between  a money-based 
PBC model  and the AFPM model  is that in the former, monetary  effects 
are the driving  force of the political-economic  cycle,  while  in the latter 
they are induced  effects,  due to the monetary  authority wanting  to offset 
fiscal effects that would  otherwise  drive up interest rates. Hence,  money 
growth  in a money-driven  PBC model  should  be expansionary  and drive 
down  interest  rates,  while  in the  AFPM model  it should  be  associated 
with  stable  or even  slightly  rising  interest  rates.  Put  another  way,  the 
monetary  expansion  in  a money-driven  model  should  be  reflected  in 
changes  in the instruments  of monetary  policy in an expansionary  direc- 
tion,  while  in  the  AFPM world,  we  should  see  an  expansion  only  in 
broad  monetary  aggregates,  not  in  instruments  of policy.  This type  of 
argument was  first put forward by Beck (1987), as discussed  in Section 8 
above.  He  found  that  the  opportunistic  monetary  growth  cycle  from 
1960 to about  1980 was  characterized by this distinction,  and in regres- 
sions  such  as  (4) he  found  no  political  effects  on  the  fed  funds  rate to 
match the M1 political cycle. This distinction  is summarized  by the differ- 
ence between  the money  growth  over a president's  term in Figures 4 and 
5 and by the federal funds rate shown  in Figure 6, where  there is no clear 
political effect.24 
24. In fact, in the post-1979  period,  the  fed funds  rate actually  rises in the quarter before 
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A  second  broad  prediction  of  the  AFPM  model  is  that  monetary 
growth before an election  should  reflect fiscal impulses.  Note  that one is 
not testing  whether  fiscal manipulation  or voters' responses  are rational, 
but  whether  there  is  a  causal  connection  between  the  fiscal  and  the 
monetary  cycle. As reported in Section 6, both Keech and Pak (1989) and 
Alesina  (1988) found  an electoral  cycle  for transfers between  1961 and 
the late 1970s or early 1980s, which  has since disappeared.  The strongest 
evidence  for an Mi-growth-rate  electoral cycle is over the same  period, 
while  there is no such cycle after 1980. 
Of  course,  correlation  is  not  causation.  A  stronger  test  is  to  show 
whether  when  an electoral monetary  cycle exists,  it can be explained  by 
the  fiscal  cycle,  as  opposed  to  simply  a political  dummy.  Beck (1987) 
performs  such  a test and argues  that fiscal variables can in fact explain 
the  1960-1978  electoral  cycle  in M1 growth  rates.  In Drazen  (2000b), I 
present regression  results that show  a money  growth cycle over this time 
period  (but the  absence  of  a federal-funds-rate  cycle)  and  an electoral 
cycle  in both  net  transfers to GNP  and the ratio of the fiscal surplus  to 
GNP  over  the  same  period.25 Moreover,  when  the  ratio  of  the  fiscal 
surplus  to  GNP  is  included  as  an  explanatory  variable  in  the  money 
growth regressions,  the political dummy  to capture electoral effects loses 
much of its significance. 
A broader question  is whether  there is significant  evidence  of an op- 
portunistic  PBC in  the  aggregate  data  for  the  United  States.  On  the 
whole,  the  evidence  is not  strong  for effects  on  many  macroeconomic 
aggregates.  A key point of the AFPM model  is that there can be a signifi- 
cant electoral  cycle  in policy  instruments-significant  in  that it affects 
voting-without  there  being  clear  aggregate  implications.  "Traces" of 
monetary  effects  that  are observed  may  be  simply  an  attempt  by  the 
central bank to aim for an absence  of aggregate  effects that can be attrib- 
uted to monetary  policy! Of course,  if the fiscal manipulation  is large, as 
is the case in some  developing  countries,  we  should  expect  to see  large 
aggregate  effects. 
Though  the empirical findings  are only  suggestive  at this point,  they 
should,  at the  very  least,  induce  us  to rethink  our approach  to PBCs. 
This  paper  was  in  part  survey  and  in  part  new  research  induced  by 
considering  what we have learned from twenty-five  years of research on 
PBCs. The survey  was  meant to convey  a very clear message:  monetary 
25. One  interesting  result in this regard is that in the  1960-1978  sample,  there appears  to 
be a significant  positive  effect on money  growth  in the election  quarter itself, which  is 
too  late if monetary  policy  is meant  to increase  economic  activity before  the  election. 
On  the  other hand,  if monetary  policy  is counteracting  the  effects  of fiscal policy  on 
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surprises  are an  unconvincing  driving  force  for political  cycles,  either 
opportunistic  or partisan; research should  concentrate  on fiscal policy as 
the driving  force,  especially  for opportunistic  cycles.  Political monetary 
cycles  are more  likely  the  effect  of  accommodation  of  fiscal  impulses, 
that is, monetary  policy is passive  while  fiscal policy is active in trying to 
affect election  outcomes. 
Appendix.  Derivation  of Interest-Rate  Rules26 
The monetary authority  minimizes a loss function 
X2 
2 
cr  -  +  +Ft,  (Al) 
2  2 
where  Ft represents  future expected  loss from inflation and output,  sub- 
ject to (12). This yields  an optimal  relation between  xt and  irt of the form 
1 
Xt=  -  -  t  (A2) 
Combining  this condition  with  the aggregate  supply  curve  (12) and im- 
posing  rational  expectations  yields  xt and  rt as functions  of the  supply 
shock st, namely, 
Xt =  hst,  TTt =  -o-hst,  (A3) 
where  EtTrt+l  = pst and h =  [1 + o-(1 -  p)]-1. The optimal interest-rate rule 
then  follows  from substituting  the desired  value  of xt into the linearized 
aggregate  demand  relation (15) to obtain the nominal interest rate consis- 
tent with  the output  target, which  is equation  (19). 
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Comment 
ALBERTO ALESINA 
Harvard  University,  NBER,  and CEPR 
1. Introduction 
The purpose  of Allan  Drazen's  fine  paper  is twofold:  (1) to assess  the 
literature on  political  business  cycles,  and  (2) to provide  a new  model 
that combines  monetary  and fiscal policies  as driving  forces of opportu- 
nistic cycles.  I will focus,  as a discussant  is supposed  to do, on the points 
of disagreement. 
Let me begin by noting  that one  should  not expect  that every election 
will create the same predictable  pattern of policy  choices.  Some  govern- 
ments may use monetary  instruments  to achieve partisan or opportunist 
goals,  others  may  use  the  fiscal  instruments.  Initial  conditions  may 
matter as well: in certain cases showing  fiscal restraint may be a political 
plus,  while  fiscal  expansions  in  election  years  may  be  punished.  For 
instance  Alesina,  Perotti, and Tavares (1998) show  that voters  in OECD 
countries do not always  reward governments  that are fiscally expansion- 
ary.  Alesina  (2000)  discusses  the  complex  political  economy  of  the 
current  U.S.  budget  surplus.  Spending  more  or taxing  less  in election 
years is only  one  of many  aspects  of the politics  of fiscal policy. Drazen 
writes that "the reliance on monetary policy as the driving force of cycles 
is inconsistent  with  the evidence  on the important  role of fiscal policy." 
Why? I do not understand  why  it has to be one  or the other. This fiscal- 
vs.-monetary  "horse race" is a bit distracting from the main issues  in this 
literature, namely whether voters behave rationally, whether  opportunis- 
tic behavior  is important  (and in which  countries  and in which  political 
systems),  whether  partisan motivations  were and are still strong,  which 
electoral systems  are more or less prone  to create cycles,  what influence 
the degree  of central-bank  independence  can have,  what  are the differ- 
ent issues  arising in developed  and developing  countries,  etc. 
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2. Review  of the  Literature 
2.1 THE  OPPORTUNISTIC  CYCLE  AND RATIONAL  VOTERS 
A striking  feature  of the  opportunistic  cycle  of growth  and  unemploy- 
ment  is that while  there is ample evidence  that the state of the economy 
(especially  GDP  growth)  affects  electoral  results,  there  is no  evidence 
that  in  terms  of  growth  and  unemployment  the  economy  does  better 
than average  in election  years.  This is clearly true for the United  States 
and  also  for  other  OECD  countries.  Is this  a puzzle?  Not  quite.  The 
rational versions  of the  opportunistic  model  provide  models  consistent 
with  these  observations.  Since  this  is a point  that Drazen  does  not  de- 
velop  much,  it is worth explaining.  I will sketch the approach developed 
in Alesina  and Rosenthal  (1995). Consider  an output  equation 
Xt =t  -  'T  +  7t  +  Et,  (1) 
where  x is a measure  of economic  activity, 7r  is inflation,  and  -Te is ratio- 
nally  expected  inflation.  The shock  E is a random  noise  that represent 
luck, and q7  represents  government  competence  in managing  the economy 
and evolves,  for instance,  with  a MA(1) structure: 
]t =  t-_1  +  Ut,  (2) 
where  u  is  an  i.i.d.  shock.  Higher  competence  means  that  output  is 
higher  for given  inflation  rate. Suppose  that at the moment  of the elec- 
tion that takes place at the end of period  t the public observes  xt, 7Tt,  and 
t7T  but  cannot  distinguish  between  luck  and  competence.  That is,  the 
public observes  the sum  mt  +  Et but not its components.  Note  that some 
form  of  persistence  in  competence  is  necessary;  otherwise  forward- 
looking  voters  would  not  care about  the  current state  of the  economy. 
Rational voters prefer to re-elect competent  governments;  therefore they 
will use  observations  on xt (thus  on  mt  +  Et) as a noisy  signal  of compe- 
tence.  In this model  the policymaker  cannot engage  in strategic manipu- 
lations  of  the  economy  using  monetary  or  fiscal  instruments  (which 
would  affect  inflation);  thus  the  rate of  growth  (or unemployment)  in 
election  years is not different  from average.  Nevertheless,  the higher  x, 
is, the more likely it is that the incumbent  will be elected.  Thus the state 
of  the  economy  affects  electoral  results,  but  opportunistic  cycles  a la 
Nordhaus  are not  present.  This  simple  approach  thus  reconciles  two 
features  of the  empirical  evidence.  Note  that Wolfers (1999) has  found 
considerable  evidence  of  sophisticated  voting  behavior  exactly  in  the Comment  ?  119 
sense  that voters  try to distinguish  competence  from luck. Alesina  and 
Rosenthal  (1995), on the other hand,  find inconclusive  results on voters' 
rationality  in a competence-type  model.  In particular, American  voters 
seem  too sensitive  to the rate of growth  in election  years. 
In this  version  of the  model  there  is no  scope  for manipulation,  but 
Persson  and Tabellini (1990) apply  Rogoff's  (1990) model  of competence 
and,  by  assuming  asymmetric  information  on  the  observation  of infla- 
tion and output,  show  that even  with  rational voters  one  can have pre- 
electoral manipulations  of inflation and growth.  So one of the questions 
that Drazen raises in his Section 8 (summing  up),  namely, how  rational- 
ity  of voters  can be  consistent  with  opportunistic  cycles,  has  received 
one  answer  already. Alesina  and  Rosenthal  (1995) merge  this model  of 
retrospective  voting  with  a  partisan  approach,  so  that  the  electorate 
votes  on two grounds:  competence  and "ideology." 
In summary: it should  be clear that one can have  retrospective  voting 
based  on  competence  without  opportunistic  manipulations.  I am  not 
saying  that the latter do not occur, but it should  be clear that retrospec- 
tive voting  and active manipulations  do not necessarily  go hand in hand. 
While I made  this point  using  an inflation-output  framework,  the same 
applies  in a fiscal-competence  example. 
2.2 OPPORTUNISTIC  MONETARY  AND FISCAL  POLICY 
Rational behavior  of voters,  plus  the  inherent  difficulty  in timing  and 
controlling  the  business  cycle,  may  restrict  opportunistic  behavior  of 
policymakers  with respect to instruments  like monetary and fiscal policy. 
Drazen reviews  carefully much empirical research on fiscal cycles both in 
OECD  countries  and  in  developing  ones.  My  view  of  this  empirical 
evidence  is that in OECD countries  there are several  examples  of fiscal 
relaxation  in  election  years,  in  some  cases  accompanied  by  monetary 
relaxation. However,  the evidence  is not overly strong,  and it should  not 
be.  If a policymaker  went  too  far in  the  direction  of  election-oriented 
fiscal policy, the public would  punish  him because  the electorate  can be 
fooled  only up to a point.  Shi and Svensson  (2000) in fact provide  some 
interesting  evidence  that fiscal cycles may be more prevalent  in countries 
where  the voters  have  less  access  to a free press  and other mechanisms 
to monitor  the policymaker.  Alesina,  Perotti, and Tavares (1998) do not 
find that the timing of fiscal adjustments  is particularly influenced  by the 
timing  of elections  in OECD countries.  In summary, opportunistic  fiscal 
cycles  are there in some  countries  and in some  elections.  As implied  by 
rational  models  a la Rogoff  (1990) and  Rogoff  and  Sibert (1988),  these 
cycles  cannot  be  too  large  and  predictable.  I also  agree  that,  as a vast 
literature on lobbying  shows,  favors to certain groups  may be critical for 120 *  ALESINA 
electoral  victory,  even  though  these  favors  may  not  show  up  as large 
fluctuations  of macro variables. 
2.3 PARTISAN  MODELS 
The traditional  partisan  model  due  to Hibbs  is based  on  an exploitable 
Phillips  curve where  left-wing  and right-wing  governments  can choose 
permanently  different  levels  of unemployment,  growth,  and  inflation. 
In my  work,  started  in the late eighties,  I embodied  partisan  parties  in 
models  with  rational expectations  and consistent  with  a fairly standard 
neo-Keynesian  model  of the economy  with  wage  contracts  a la Fischer 
(1977).  The  idea  was  that  if elections  cannot  be  predicted,  the  future 
course  of aggregate  demand  policy  cannot be predicted.  Thus electoral 
uncertainty  is associated  with  policy  uncertainty  that leads  to partisan 
cycles which  are short-lived  in real economic  activity but may be longer- 
lived  in inflation.  I am probably not an impartial reader of the literature, 
but  I find the partisan  effects  on growth  and  unemployment  predicted 
by this model  to be by far the strongest  of all the regularities  uncovered 
by  the  literature  on  political  business  cycles,  in  the  United  States  in 
particular and in OECD countries  more  generally.  As  for the latter, the 
evidence  is  stronger  in  OECD  countries  with  two-party  (or two-bloc) 
systems.  This last point  reinforces  the theory,  since  multiparty  systems 
normally  led by large centrist coalitions  (as in Italy until recently) do not 
conform  to the setup  of the theory.  For instance,  Alesina,  Roubini,  and 
Cohen  (1997) calculate that the difference between  the rates of growth  of 
GDP from the beginning  of a left-wing  government  and of a right-wing 
government  in  a sample  of  19 OECD  countries  reaches  2.2% about  6 
quarters after a change  of government  (sample,  1960 to 1993). The same 
figure for the United  States is larger, about 3.5%.1 These partisan differ- 
ences  disappear  about two years after an election. 
Drazen  raises several criticisms of this model  that lead him to empha- 
size  even  in the  abstract of his  paper  that "models  based  on monetary 
surprises  ...  are  unconvincing  explanations  of...  partisan  cycles." 
The first conceptual  objection is that wage  contracts could be adjusted ex 
ante to incorporate  the electoral  uncertainty,  either by being  contingent 
on  the  election  result  or by being  signed  after the  election.  This is  an 
important  issue  that to some extent applies  to all nominal-contract  mod- 
els.  One  could  give  the battery of standard answers  to why  agents  may 
lock  themselves  in  nominal  contracts,  such  as  menu-cost  arguments.2 
More interesting  is the direct evidence  on this point  raised by Garfinkel 
1. See Alesina,  Roubini,  and Cohen  (1997, p.  152). 
2. See Alesina  and Rosenthal  (1995) for an extensive  discussion  of this point. Comment.  121 
and Glazer (1994). As Drazen notes,  these  authors show  that a fraction of 
wage  contracts  to be signed  in election  years  are adjusted  to be signed 
after the election.  I find this very strong evidence  in favor of the electoral 
uncertainty  model.  Note  that Glazer and Garfinkel find  that some,  but 
not  all,  contracts  are  adjusted.  Thus,  according  to  these  results,  the 
agents  recognize  the role of electoral  uncertainty  but can protect  them- 
selves  only partially. This seems  to me one of the strongest  direct confir- 
mations  of the theory. If these  authors had found  that nobody  readjusts 
contracts, a critic of the rational-partisan theory would  have said that the 
latter is irrelevant,  since nobody  cares about electoral  uncertainty.  If all 
contracts  were  readjusted,  the  same  critic would  say  that the  rational- 
partisan  theory  cannot  work.  The only  result fully  compatible  with  the 
rational-partisan  theory is the one found by Garfinkel and Glazer (1994). 
A second  objection  concerns  direct tests  of the role of electoral uncer- 
tainty. Chapter 5 of Alesina,  Roubini,  and Cohen  (1997), which  is based 
on the PhD thesis  of Cohen  (1993), is fully devoted  to direct tests  of the 
electoral uncertainty.  Based on pre-electoral  polls,  Cohen  calculates  the 
ex ante probability of a Democratic or Republican victory for every post- 
war election.  Note  that ex post  landslides  may not always  coincide  with 
pre-electoral  sentiments,  especially  if evaluated  several  months  before 
an election,  the timing  relevant  for a wage-contract  (or a nominal-price 
rigidity) model.  While some election  outcomes  may be very clear the day 
before,  they  were  not six months  ahead.  For instance,  the 1980 election 
was much more uncertain ex ante than the Reagan victory may indicate. 
The  current  election  at this  date  (July 2000) is  very  unpredictable.  By 
October 2000 it may appear as a sure bet, and 20 years from now  we may 
just  remember  a  landslide  victory.  These  considerations  suggest  that 
impressions  about electoral uncertainty  ex post may be misleading. 
Cohen  discusses  two  types  of evidence.  One  considers  the expected 
inflation implied  by the term structure of interest  rates. This measure  of 
expected  inflation  seems  to be related to the ex ante anticipation  of who 
is going  to win  the next  election,  in a way  consistent  with  the partisan 
theory. The second  set of tests relates electoral uncertainty  to the size of 
fluctuations  of growth,  again with  positive  results  for the  theory. I am 
not arguing  that the issue  is settled  by these  results,  but I am surprised 
that Drazen did not find it necessary  to discuss  these tests in more detail, 
given  his serious  objections  to the theory  on this point.  He simply  says, 
relative  to the  second  test,  that the  computation  is complicated  and  is 
not  consistent  with  his  (Drazen's)  assessment  of the  data.  As  a test he 
mentions  one  election  in  the  sixties.  If this  issue  "requires further  re- 
search" as Drazen  writes  (and I agree),  then  I do not  understand  how 
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A third objection is that the pattern of inflation  is not consistent  with 
the partisan theory, because  if, say, a Republican  administration  inherits 
a high inflation rate from the past, it may take a couple  of years to reduce 
it. For example,  according to this view  the first Reagan administration  in 
1981-1984  would  be  a pro-inflation  administration,  since  inflation  was 
still high  in 1981 and  1982. I find  this  the  least  convincing  of Drazen's 
criticisms.  Any  model  with  some  persistence  in inflation  would  deliver 
this result. 
Fourth, Drazen disagrees  with the inflation-augmented  Phillips curve, 
but  if I understand  correctly, his  equation  (12) is of the  same  family. It 
seems  to me that a partisan structure which  uses his equation  (12) would 
also imply  that electoral uncertainty  is relevant. 
Finally, it is true,  as Drazen  emphasizes,  that the evidence  on policy 
instruments  is  weaker  for  the  partisan  theory  than  the  evidence  on 
growth  and unemployment.  My reading of these  results is that different 
administrations  in the United  States or governments  of other countries 
may use  different combinations  of policies  to achieve  their goals,  and by 
looking  at one  or the  other one  may  find weaker  results.  For instance, 
suppose  than one  looks  at monetary  policy  and some  governments  use 
fiscal policy as their main policy  instrument.  Evidence  of partisan mone- 
tary policy  may be weak  not because  partisan motivations  are weak but 
because  of  difficulties  in  isolating  one  specific  policy  instrument.  For 
instance,  Perotti and Kontopoulos  (1999) find evidence  of partisan fiscal 
policy  in  OECD  countries,  while  Alesina,  Roubini,  and  Cohen  (1997) 
find evidence  of partisan monetary  policy. 
3.  The  AFPM  Model 
In the final part of the paper Drazen  extends  Rogoff's  (1990) and Rogoff 
and Sibert's (1988) model  of fiscal policy  in order to incorporate a mone- 
tary accommodation.  This is a Rogoff-type  model with a monetary policy 
equation  containing  an exogenous  parameter that captures the degree  of 
pressure  of the fiscal authority. There is some  connection  here with  the 
literature on monetary-fiscal  policy games originating  from the unpleas- 
ant monetarist  arithmetic by Sargent and Wallace. This connection  would 
be worth  exploring.  Let me raise a few points: 
1.  A  key  assumption  is  that  the  money-supply  growth  rate  is  unob- 
served  contemporaneously  by the voters.  Otherwise  the voters could 
infer  the  competence  of  the  incumbent  and  the  model  would  not 
deliver  interesting  results.  Some  sort  of  asymmetric  information  is 
crucial to deliver  opportunistic  manipulations  with  rational voters.  I Comment*  123 
find  Rogoff's  assumption  that the  asymmetric  information  is about 
the composition  of the budget  more convincing  than the one that the 
voters  cannot figure out if the central bank is accommodating  or not. 
More generally,  assumptions  about  asymmetry  of information  seem 
to have  a higher  status  than  assumptions  about  imperfect  nominal 
contracting.  I see this simply  as a matter of taste. 
2.  A key element  of this model  is the amount  of pressure  that the presi- 
dent puts on the central bank for accommodation.  It seems  to me that 
the obvious  (and perhaps  the only) way  to test this model  is to check 
whether  this  accommodation  occurs  more  or less  in countries  with 
different levels  of central-bank independence.  This would  be an inter- 
esting  exercise. 
3.  A somewhat  unfair criticism of the model  would  be to ask why  the 
government  would  want  to have  an independent  central bank at all 
here.  But there are reasons  outside  the model why  central-bank inde- 
pendence  may  be  desirable.  Perhaps  one  might  try to bring  in this 
point  more  directly,  also  in reference  to empirical  testing,  as of my 
previous  point.  Also,  an endogenous  determination  of  the  optimal 
degree  of  central-bank  independence  would  provide  a  more  solid 
derivation  of the central bank's objective function,  which  in this ver- 
sion of the model  is fairly arbitrary. 
I am not quite sure what to make of the empirical evidence  discussed  in 
the last section of the paper. The author refers to another paper by him on 
more formal empirical tests on the United States. Based upon my previous 
work,  I find it hard to believe  that one can find strong evidence  of large 
opportunistic  cycles based on either monetary or fiscal policy in this coun- 
try, because  information  circulation  and central-bank independence  are 
relatively high.  In fact, one may argue that lack of strong evidence  on the 
United States would be in favor of the spirit of the model.  My sense  is that 
in order to find evidence  for the AFPM model,  or of any other model  of 
opportunistic  cycles,  I would  look at other countries  besides  the United 
States and make cross-country  comparisons. 
In summary, I found  things  to like in this paper and things to disagree 
with.  Three concluding  points: First, my main general point of disagree- 
ment  is with  the attempt  to emphasize  a somewhat  misleading  contrast 
between  those  who  argue that monetary  policy  is the driving  force and 
those  who  argue that fiscal policy  is.  Second,  I find the AFPM model  a 
reasonable  and interesting  extension  of Rogoff's  work.  I look forward to 
seeing it tested in cross-country  data sets. Third, Drazen finds unconvinc- 
ing both opportunistic  and partisan models  based  on inflation surprises, 
but he did not offer an alternative and more convincing  partisan model. 124 *  WALSH 
REFERENCES 
Alesina,  A. (2000). The political economy  of budget  surpluses.  Journal  of Economic 
Perspectives,  forthcoming. 
, Perotti,  and  J. Tavares.  (1998).  The  political  economy  of  fiscal  adjust- 
ments.  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity 1:197-248. 
,N.  Roubini,  and G. Cohen.  (1997). Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy, 
Cambridge Mass: The MIT Press. 
,  and  H.  Rosenthal.  (1995).  Partisan Cycles, Divided Government, and the 
Economy, Cambridge  UK: Cambridge University  Press. 
Cohen,  D.  (1993). Pre- and  postelection  macroeconomic  fluctuations.  Harvard 
University.  PhD Dissertation. 
Fischer,  S.  (1997).  Long  term  contracts,  rational  expectations  and  the  optimal 
money  supply  rule. Journal  of Political Economy  85:191-206. 
Garfinkel, M.,  and A. Glazer. (1994). Does  electoral uncertainty  cause economic 
fluctuations?  American Economic  Review, 84:169-173. 
Perotti, R.,  and J. Kontopoulos.  (1999). Fragmented  fiscal policy.  Unpublished. 
Person,  T., and G. Tabellini. (1990). Macroeconomic  Policy, Credibility,  and Politics. 
Chur, Switzerland:  Harwood  Academic  Publishers. 
Rogoff,  K. (1990). Equilibrium political budget  cycles.  American Economic  Review 
80:21-36. 
Rogoff,  K.,  and  A.  Sibert.  (1988).  Elections  and  macroeconomic  policy  cycles. 
Review of Economic  Studies 55:1-16. 
Shi,  M.,  and  J. Svensson.  (2000).  Political  business  cycles  in  developed  and 
developing  countries.  World Bank. Working Paper. 
Wolfers,  J. (1999).  Are  voters  rational? Evidence  from  gubernatorial  elections. 
Unpublished. 
Comment1 
CARL E. WALSH 
University  of California,  Santa  Cruz, and Federal  Reserve  Bank  of San Francisco 
1. Introduction 
Allan  Drazen  achieves  two  objectives  in  his  paper.  First,  he  provides  a 
brief  but  critical  survey  of  the  political-business-cycle  (PBC)  literature, 
managing  to cover  both  the  theoretical  and  empirical  results  on  opportu- 
nistic  and  partisan  models.  This  summary  draws  on  material  from  his 
excellent  new  book  (Drazen,  2000).  Second,  he  develops  a new  model  of 
the  PBC,  one  that  draws  on  the  earlier  work  by  Ken  Rogoff  and  others 
focusing  on  fiscal  policy  as  the  source  of politically  driven  macro  effects. 
1. Any opinions expressed are not necessarily thpse of the Federal  Reserve Bank  of San 
Francisco  or the Federal  Reserve  System. I would like to thank  Alina Carare  for research 
assistance. 
124 *  WALSH 
REFERENCES 
Alesina,  A. (2000). The political economy  of budget  surpluses.  Journal  of Economic 
Perspectives,  forthcoming. 
, Perotti,  and  J. Tavares.  (1998).  The  political  economy  of  fiscal  adjust- 
ments.  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity 1:197-248. 
,N.  Roubini,  and G. Cohen.  (1997). Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy, 
Cambridge Mass: The MIT Press. 
,  and  H.  Rosenthal.  (1995).  Partisan Cycles, Divided Government, and the 
Economy, Cambridge  UK: Cambridge University  Press. 
Cohen,  D.  (1993). Pre- and  postelection  macroeconomic  fluctuations.  Harvard 
University.  PhD Dissertation. 
Fischer,  S.  (1997).  Long  term  contracts,  rational  expectations  and  the  optimal 
money  supply  rule. Journal  of Political Economy  85:191-206. 
Garfinkel, M.,  and A. Glazer. (1994). Does  electoral uncertainty  cause economic 
fluctuations?  American Economic  Review, 84:169-173. 
Perotti, R.,  and J. Kontopoulos.  (1999). Fragmented  fiscal policy.  Unpublished. 
Person,  T., and G. Tabellini. (1990). Macroeconomic  Policy, Credibility,  and Politics. 
Chur, Switzerland:  Harwood  Academic  Publishers. 
Rogoff,  K. (1990). Equilibrium political budget  cycles.  American Economic  Review 
80:21-36. 
Rogoff,  K.,  and  A.  Sibert.  (1988).  Elections  and  macroeconomic  policy  cycles. 
Review of Economic  Studies 55:1-16. 
Shi,  M.,  and  J. Svensson.  (2000).  Political  business  cycles  in  developed  and 
developing  countries.  World Bank. Working Paper. 
Wolfers,  J. (1999).  Are  voters  rational? Evidence  from  gubernatorial  elections. 
Unpublished. 
Comment1 
CARL E. WALSH 
University  of California,  Santa  Cruz, and Federal  Reserve  Bank  of San Francisco 
1. Introduction 
Allan  Drazen  achieves  two  objectives  in  his  paper.  First,  he  provides  a 
brief  but  critical  survey  of  the  political-business-cycle  (PBC)  literature, 
managing  to cover  both  the  theoretical  and  empirical  results  on  opportu- 
nistic  and  partisan  models.  This  summary  draws  on  material  from  his 
excellent  new  book  (Drazen,  2000).  Second,  he  develops  a new  model  of 
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The model  differs from earlier approaches  in incorporating  the notion  of 
a passive  Fed, trying to "keep its head  down"  during election  years. 
In achieving  these  two objectives,  he has made me rethink the role of 
electoral  factors  in  affecting  monetary  policy;  I was  left  unconvinced 
that,  at least  from the  perspective  of U.S.  macroeconomics  and  mone- 
tary economics,  opportunistic  PBCs with  aggregate  effects  are of major 
importance. 
2.  What  Are  the  Basic  "Facts"? 
To assess  both the survey  Drazen presents  and the new  model  he devel- 
ops,  one  needs  to examine  the basic "facts" the PBC literature has tried 
to explain.  I will focus  my attention  on the United  States,  both because 
that is the country  I know  best,  and because  Drazen's  discussion  of the 
empirical evidence  on PBCs draws primarily on findings  from the United 
States.  This focus  has  its drawbacks.  The relevance  of PBC models  ap- 
pears  to be  much  greater in other  countries,  and  Drazen  does  provide 
some  discussion  of the international  evidence. 
3.  The  Survey  of the  Previous  Literature 
Drazen  organizes  his  survey  round  the  distinction  between  monetary 
opportunistic  and partisan models.  As he stresses,  the active manipula- 
tion  of monetary  policy  for macro ends  plays  a critical role in both  ap- 
proaches.  As  he  also  stresses,  the  notion  that  the  president  is able to 
manipulate  monetary policy to achieve his desired outcome  is simply not 
plausible  as a description  of the relationship  between  the president  and 
the Fed. This leads him to reject the standard opportunistic  and partisan 
models  that have  relied  on monetary  surprises  as the key transmission 
channel  through  which  political factors influence  the macroeconomy. 
I agree with  this assessment,  at least as it applies  to the United States. 
The evidence  for strong political effects operating through monetary pol- 
icy just isn't there. In part, this is because  they are only one among many 
sources of macroeconomic  fluctuations.  Given the few elections  and busi- 
ness  cycles  since  1960 (the period that is the focus of much of this litera- 
ture), it would  be hard to discern political effects using time-series  econo- 
metrics. And the existing empirical work in this area has generally  failed 
to deal with  the important  issue  of simultaneity.  Did the  1960 and  1990 
recessions  bring victory  to Kennedy  and  Clinton,  or did  Kennedy  and 
Clinton bring us the postrecession  (and postelection)  expansions? 
In one of the most careful attempts to deal with the problem of simulta- 
neity,  Faust and Irons (1999) conclude  the  economic  effects  on election 126 *  WALSH 
outcomes  are more likely than election  effects  on the economy.  Accord- 
ing to Faust and Irons, 
There  is, at best, weak and fragile  evidence in favor of important  presidential- 
cycle effects in US macroeconomic data. The strongest evidence seems to 
come from the first half of Republican  administrations:  recessions have fol- 
lowed the election of Republicans  and macroeconomic  factors  alone may not 
account  for this fact. There  is little evidence, however, that the causal  explana- 
tions of any political effects on the economy operates through changes in 
monetary policy. Thus, we  find little support for the view that empirical 
monetary  models should include political  variables.  (p. 84) 
While causality cannot be reliably  assessed in nonexperimental  data, we cannot 
reject the view that the data show only causalityfrom the economy to party and 
not the other way around. (p. 85) 
Two points  are worth noting.  First, the evidence  from Faust and Irons 
relates to aggregate  variables, so it is consistent  with either opportunistic 
or partisan  manipulation  of  fiscal  instruments  that have  distributional 
consequences  but not aggregate  effects.  In fact, the current presidential 
election  provides  numerous  examples  of the incumbent-party  candidate 
announcing  spending  programs  that seem  intended  to reward  specific 
constituents  rather than to have  any macroeconomic  effects. 
Second,  the results are also consistent with isolated incidences  in which 
fiscal manipulations  might have had aggregate effects. The 1972 presiden- 
tial election  comes  to mind  as an example,  and as Drazen mentions,  it is 
not surprising  that the PBC literature really starts in the mid-1970s with 
the  work  of Nordhaus  and  Hibbs.  The Nixon-McGover  contest  pro- 
vided  the key observation  in the United  States that motivated  work  de- 
signed  to understand  how  elections  might  create incentives  that distort 
policy  and thereby the macroeconomy. 
What I take from Faust and Irons's work  is that there are no compel- 
ling  facts against  which  to judge  PBC models.  If we  focus  on the post- 
1960 period as Drazen does in this paper, I am just not convinced  there is 
anything  at the  aggregate  level  that needs  to be  explained  via political 
models.  Furthermore,  Drazen's  survey  of  the  empirical  evidence  sug- 
gests  that what  electoral effects may have been present  in the 1960s and 
1970s  have  disappeared  in  the  post-1980  period.  The  Volcker  tenure 
really did represent  a monetary  policy  regime  shift.  This doesn't  mean 
there  aren't  electoral  effects  on  government  spending  decisions.  But 
evidence  that spending  fluctuates  isn't necessarily  evidence  that this is a 
source of business-cycle  behavior. Comment 127 
Let me  contrast  this  with  the  time-inconsistency  literature  in mone- 
tary policy.  There were  at least two  important  puzzles  facing monetary 
political  economists  in the  late  1970s.  First, why  were  many  countries 
experiencing  high  inflation  even  though  everyone  seemed  to agree that 
inflation was bad, most agreed that there were no permanent  gains from 
higher  average  inflation,  and  we  all knew  how  inflation  could  be  re- 
duced? And second,  why  did governments  so often fail to carry through 
their announced  intentions  to reduce inflation?2 These were real puzzles 
that needed  understanding. 
In contrast, one almost gets the sense  that, when  applied to the United 
States,  PBC literature  is  theory  in  search  of  an  application.  There  are 
many  intellectually  appealing  game-theoretic  models,  but  what  puzzle 
are these  models  trying  to address?  What are the empirical regularities 
they need  to explain? 
4.  The  AFPM  Model 
Given  the weaknesses  he identifies  in the basic opportunistic  and parti- 
san  models,  Drazen's  proposed  alternative  is the  active-fiscal,  passive- 
monetary  (AFPM) model.  This model  combines  a signaling  model with a 
specification  of monetary  policy  that differs significantly  from that used 
in previous  work. 
The basic intuition is borrowed  from the budget-cycle  model  of Rogoff 
(1990).  Elected  officials  differ  in  their  ability  to  provide  public  goods. 
Their competence,  however,  is not  observed  directly by voters.  During 
the runup  to an election,  a competent  incumbent  may distort the provi- 
sion of public goods  in an attempt to signal her competency.  Allan com- 
bines this with a model of passive  monetary policy. The monetary author- 
ity wants  to stabilize output and inflation, but the target levels  for output 
and inflation in the monetary  authority's  loss function  differ from those 
of the public  (and the politicians).  If a competent  fiscal authority tries to 
signal  to voters  by increasing  government  consumption,  the  monetary 
authority  is  forced  to  boost  interest  rates  to  offset  the  fiscal  effect  on 
output.  By itself,  this would  imply we  should  observe  political cycles in 
the policy instruments  of both the fiscal and monetary authorities but no 
cycle  in  output.  If the  monetary  authority  implements  policy  through 
control of a nominal interest rate, then prior to an election,  nominal  rates 
should  rise and money  growth  should  fall. 
To  generate  outcomes  more  in  line  with  the  empirical  evidence, 
Drazen  makes  two  further  assumptions.  First, the  public  has  a higher 
2. There  are similar  puzzles  on  the  fiscal  side.  Persson  and  Tabellini  (2000) summarize 
these,  but they are not related to business-cycle  issues. 128 *  WALSH 
output  target than the monetary  authority. This implies  that the incum- 
bent politician  can gain votes by lobbying  the monetary authority to limit 
interest-rate  increases  and to allow output  to expand.  And second,  such 
lobbying  is assumed  to be costly to the politician-this  serves to limit the 
extent  of  the  pressure  brought  to bear on  the  monetary  authority.  To- 
gether,  these two assumptions  imply that a competent  incumbent  boosts 
fiscal spending  to signal competence  and pressures  the monetary  author- 
ity so  that interest  rates are not  raised  sufficiently  to completely  offset 
the aggregate  impact of the fiscal spending.  As a consequence,  prior to 
an election,  fiscal spending,  interest  rates,  output,  and  money  growth 
should  all rise,  but  only  if the  incumbent  is competent  (at least  in the 
separating  equilibrium). 
4.1 THE  IMPLICIT  VIEW  OF MONETARY  POLICY 
One  aspect  of the AFPM model  that is a real improvement  on many  of 
the earlier PBC models  is its recognition  that the institutional  structure in 
many  countries  separates  responsibility  for monetary  policy  from  the 
direct control of elected  officials. This is certainly the case in the United 
States. The president  can bring pressure to bear on the Fed-witness  the 
role played  by  the  White  House  in  1972 that John Woolley  (1995) has 
documented-but  this is far from having  actual control over  monetary 
policy. 
In the AFPM model,  the monetary  authority has its own  agenda,  but 
its ability to achieve  its own  goals is compromised  by the stance  of fiscal 
policy.  The fiscal authority  can lobby the monetary  authority, but doing 
so  is costly  (the  exact  nature  of  this  cost  is not  specified).  If the  high- 
competence  type wishes  to signal to voters by increasing  the provision  of 
government  consumption  goods,  it must also lobby the monetary author- 
ity to expand  money  growth,  thereby  limiting the interest-rate  effects of 
the increased  government  spending. 
I think this gets at the right relationship  between  the fiscal and mone- 
tary authorities,  at least in the United  States and in other countries  with 
relatively independent  central banks. Recognizing  the institutional  struc- 
ture within  which  policy  decisions  are made  is important.  Institutional 
characteristics,  such  as central-bank  independence,  do  seem  to matter. 
Much of the PBC literature has ignored the role of institutions  other than 
in  the  timing  of  elections;  this  made  it poorly  framed  for  addressing 
many  interesting  issues  about  how  institutional  structure  affects  eco- 
nomic  outcomes.  It would  be  interesting  to  use  the  AFPM  model  to 
explore  the implications  of the degree  of central-bank independence  for 
opportunistic  cycles,  much  as Alesina  and  Gatti (1995) and Waller and 
Walsh (1996) have done  for partisan models. Comment.  129 
In the general  literature on discretionary  monetary  policy  that builds 
on  the  work  of  Kydland  and  Prescott  (1977)  and  Barro and  Gordon 
(1983), a positive  inflation bias is generated  under discretion because  the 
central  bank  has  an  output  objective  that  is  too  high  relative  to  the 
economy's  natural rate of output.  In contrast,  the AFPM model  assumes 
the central bank has an output target that is lower than that of the public. 
The fiscal authority, because  he must  face elections,  shares  the public's 
output  target.  It would  be  interesting  to  explore  whether  the  AFPM 
specification  is consistent  with  a positive  average rate of inflation.  Many 
recent  authors  have  suggested  the  inflationary  bias  of  discretionary 
monetary  policy  can be  eliminated  if the  central bank  simply  uses  the 
natural  rate of output  as its  output  target.  This is essentially  what  the 
central bank does in the AFPM model,  yet policy is still distorted (poten- 
tially) in the face of political pressures. 
While  the  separation  of the  monetary  and  fiscal authorities  is a nice 
feature  of  the  AFPM  model,  other  aspects  of  monetary  policy  in  the 
model  seem  incomplete.  For example,  why  do the output  and inflation 
preferences  of the  monetary  authority  differ from those  of the  public? 
The utility  of voters  does  not enter into the monetary  authority's  objec- 
tive function.  Perhaps it doesn't  because  the monetary  authority  is un- 
elected.3  But  even  for  the  unelected  Fed,  there  is  evidence  that  Fed 
policy  does  reflect  the  changing  concerns  of the  public  (Tootell, 1999). 
The  view  of  monetary  policy  adopted  in  the  AFPM  model  can  be 
contrasted  with  the  trend in the  monetary-policy  literature. There,  the 
literature  has  moved  progressively  away  from  ad  hoc  loss  functions, 
basing  policy  evaluation  on  the  utility  of the  representative  agent  in a 
general  equilibrium  framework.  In the AFPM model,  the monetary  au- 
thority cares about output  and inflation,  but neither  is connected  in any 
way  to the welfare  of the public. 
4.2  IS THE AFPM MODEL PLAUSIBLE? 
Drazen provides  "a quick look at the data" to assess  whether  the AFPM 
model appears consistent with the basic PBC facts discussed  in the survey 
part of  his  paper.  The  key  to  distinguishing  the  AFPM model  from  a 
standard PBC model based on the direct manipulation  of monetary policy 
lies in the correlation between  interest rates and the cycle. Under either an 
opportunistic  or a partisan model,  expansionary  monetary  policy lowers 
interest  rates-this  is the  key  transmission  mechanism  through  which 
political influences  on monetary policy induce an economic expansion.  In 
contrast,  when  monetary  policy  simply  reacts passively  in the face of a 
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fiscally induced  expansion,  interest rates rise or remain unchanged.  They 
do not fall. 
Figures  4-6  of Drazen's  paper  present  the basic evidence  for passive 
monetary  policy  in the United  States.  Figures 4 and 5 show  M1 growth 
rates by quarter of presidential  terms for 1960-1979  and 1979-1998.  Fig- 
ure  6 shows  the  funds  rate by  quarter of presidential  terms  for 1959- 
1998. To my eyes,  there does not appear to be much evidence  that either 
M1 or the  funds  rate is related  to the electoral  cycle.  However,  Drazen 
concludes  from his review  of the existing empirical literature that there is 
a pre-election  increase in money  growth rates from 1960 to 1980, and this 
forms  one  of the  observations  that the  AFPM model  is designed  to ac- 
count for. Figure 4 does  show  some increase in money  growth  in the last 
two  quarters prior  to  an  election,  but  it also  shows  a similar  increase 
about seven  quarters prior to an election.  Given the lags in the impact of 
monetary  policy  actions  on the macroeconomy,  this timing  seems  more 
consistent  with  a  traditional  opportunistic  model  in  which  money 
growth  increases  early enough  to generate  a boom  during  the  election 
year. 
More interesting  is the evidence  on the funds rate, as this has been the 
instrument  used  to implement  monetary  policy over most of the last few 
decades.  Figure 6 reveals  that the funds  rate is unrelated  to the election 
cycle over the 1959-1998  period.  Under the AFPM model,  this would  be 
consistent  with  a very  strong  political  influence  on the Fed.  Recall that 
the basic idea is that the Fed will want to boost interest rates to offset the 
expansionary  impact of the fiscal signaling.  The president  is assumed  to 
pressure  the Fed to limit the rate increases.  The evidence  seems  to sug- 
gest presidents  succeed  completely.  But this would  mean output  should 
rise prior to elections,  a prediction  that Drazen concludes  does  not hold 
(his  Regularity  2).  Of  course,  the  alternative  interpretation  is  that  the 
fiscal manipulations  are too small to have macro impacts,  and therefore 
there is no need  for the Fed to adjust its policy instrument.  This hypothe- 
sis,  however,  cannot  account  for  the  rise  in  money  growth  prior  to 
elections. 
In measuring  the impact of monetary  policy  on the economy,  it is the 
real interest  rate that should  be relevant.  Figure 1 shows,  by quarter of 
presidential  terms,  the  average  nominal  and  real funds  rate. Averages 
are shown  for the 1961-1980  and 1961-1999  periods.4 Looking at the real 
funds  rate is  appropriate  because  average  inflation  (and  therefore  the 
average funds  rate) differed  significantly  over this time period.  The time 
4. The first quarter of a term is taken to be quarter 1 of the year following  an election.  So, 
for example,  Carter's terms runs from 1977:1 to 1980:4. Comment-  131 
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series  on  the  real funds  rate appears  to be most  consistent  with  a pre- 
election  manipulation  of policy. On average,  the real funds  rate starts to 
fall a little more  than  two  years  prior to an election.  Again,  given  that 
the  lags  of monetary  policy  are on  the  order of  18 to 24 months,  this 
timing  is  consistent  with  a traditional  opportunistic  political  business 
cycle. 
Recall, however,  that the 1961-1980 period contains only five presiden- 
tial elections,  so the average behavior  might  easily be driven by a single 
presidential  term. To investigate  this possibility,  Figure 2 shows  the be- 
havior  of the  real funds  rate over  each presidential  term.  As the  figure 
shows,  the average in the previous  figure reflects a wide  range of experi- 
ence across the individual  presidential  term. Two aspects are of particu- 
lar note.  The decline  in the average real funds  rate two years prior to an 
election  that was  suggestive  of pre-election  monetary  expansions  is al- 
most  entirely  due  to the  1973-1976  Nixon-Ford  administration.  What 
this really reflects is the Fed's countercyclical  response  to the 1975 reces- 
sion.  That leaves  only  Nixon's  first term (1969-1972)  as providing  evi- 132 *  WALSH 
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dence  of a political  impact on Fed policy  related to elections.  I interpret 
this to mean the evidence  for a traditional opportunistic  monetary policy 
that was  suggested  in Figure 1 is largely spurious. 
Is there evidence  that expansionary  fiscal policy, combined  with politi- 
cal pressures,  led  the Fed to reduce  rates immediately  prior to an elec- 
tion? The most  dramatic  swing  in rates occurred  in  1980 when  Jimmy 
Carter was  running  for re-election.  The real funds  rate, which  reached 
record  highs  as  the  Fed  under  Paul Volcker moved  to  fight  inflation, 
suddenly  plummeted  in early 1980. This episode  was associated  with the 
short-lived  credit  controls  that the  White  House  pressured  the  Fed  to 
implement.  So this could be taken as evidence  in support  of the AFPM 
model,  but  the  mechanism  is somewhat  different  than  that implied  by 
the  basic  theory.  And  note  that the  credit  controls  were  removed  well 
before the 1980 election. 
5.  What  Is the Benchmarkfor  Measuring  a Passive  Policy? 
As I indicated  earlier, the relevance  of PBC models  is likely to be much 
greater in countries  other than the United States,  so it would  be interest- Comment 133 
ing to focus on a larger sample of countries.  I think the empirical analysis 
could  also  be  strengthened  if  a  clearer  benchmark  were  established 
against  which  to measure  political  influences  on  monetary  policy.  This 
lack of a benchmark is a problem with much of the empirical work in the 
PBC literature,  so  this  comment  applies  both  to Drazen's  work  on  the 
opportunistic  model  and to the existing  work on partisan models. 
In  general  terms,  we  can  write  the  funds  rate  i  as  a  function  of 
macroeconomic  variables y and political variables x: 
i =  F(y(x,z),x), 
where  the macroeconomic  variables may be affected directly by x as well 
as by other, exogenous  variables z. We know that the funds rate responds 
to economic  conditions,  usually  summarized  in terms of the unemploy- 
ment  rate and  the  rate of inflation,  so  these  would  be  part of y.  How 
should  we measure  the impact of political variables on monetary policy? 
Do we want  to measure  the partial derivatives  of F with  respect to x? Or 
should we measure the total differential, taking into account the effects of 
x on i operating  through y? 
Most  regression  work  on  PBCs  tends  to  focus  on  estimating  what 
corresponds  to the partial derivative  of F with  respect  to x.  That is,  in 
most regressions,  a list of potential y-variables are also included.  The list 
is often  short,  consisting  of lagged  unemployment  rate, for example,  as 
well  as own  lags  of the  funds  rate. But if electoral  factors affect unem- 
ployment,  as in the standard opportunistic  model,  this would  indirectly 
lead to a monetary  policy  reaction-a  reaction one  would  also presum- 
ably want  to label as "passive." 
The empirical evidence  in Alesina,  Roubini, and Cohen  (1997) displays 
similar shortcomings.  In testing for postelection  partisan effects on inter- 
est rates (see their Table 4.9,  p.  99), they  regress  nominal  interest  rates 
on own  lags and a dummy  for the party holding  the presidency.  Finding 
that  interest  rates  are higher  under  Democratic  administrations,  they 
interpret  this  as  evidence  of  greater  expansionary  policies  and  higher 
inflation  under  Democratic  presidents.  But is this  the  right interpreta- 
tion?  If unemployment  is  higher  under  Republicans,  as  the  partisan 
model  implies,  then  the  lower  interest  rates under  Republicans  might 
reflect the normal Fed reaction to unemployment.  Regressing  i on politi- 
cal dummies  alone  will  correctly measure  the total effect  (i.e.,  the total 
differential  of F) only  if the  other  omitted  factors,  the  things  in z,  are 
uncorrelated  with  political  factors.  But if politics  responds  to the econ- 
omy, this won't  be the case. 
My general  conclusion  is that to investigate  political effects  on mone- 134 - WALSH 
tary policy,  we  need  a benchmark-what  would  monetary  policy  have 
been  in the absence  of electoral influences? 
6.  Summary 
Let  me  briefly  summarize  my  reactions  to  the  two  components  of 
Drazen's  paper.  The  survey  provides  an  excellent  assessment  of  the 
literature. The AFPM model  is an attractive model  in that it recognizes 
that monetary  policy in most countries  is not simply  the tool of the fiscal 
authority. By taking account explicitly of the separation  of monetary  and 
fiscal policy,  the model  can provide  a framework  for investigating  how 
changes  that affect the central bank's incentives  might affect the political 
business  cycle. 
The  evidence  that  the  AFPM  model  applies  to  the  United  States  is 
weak,  however.  I don't find this surprising.  There is evidence  that some 
fiscal instruments  (transfers being  the prime candidate)  are manipulated 
for election effects.  The problem for the AFPM model is that there is little 
evidence  that this fiscal activism  has  any macro effect,  and if it doesn't 
affect the macro economy,  it cannot account for an induced  reaction by a 
passive  monetary  authority. 
Econometric  time-series  analysis  can, at times,  be a powerful  tool for 
testing  hypotheses  suggested  by economic  theory. However,  the contri- 
butions  of econometrics  to our understanding  of political influences  on 
U.S.  economic  policy  may be limited.  We have  only  9 elections  (soon  to 
be 10) if we restrict attention  to the post-1960 period.  Combined  with the 
fact  that  most  economic  fluctuations  are  at best  loosely  connected  to 
elections,  the lack of degrees  of freedom  is daunting. 
So how  can we  test  political  theories?  Here,  I think  the  tools  of the 
historian  are more  enlightening  than  econometrics.  John Woolley,  for 
example,  has  explored  in  great  depth  the  influence  the  Nixon  White 
House  brought  to bear on Arthur Bums in 1972, and he does  so not with 
econometrics  but  by  reading  the  diaries  of  H.  R.  Haldeman,  Nixon's 
chief of staff. Further case studies  might be the most  informative  means 
for exposing  the  "facts" that political  business  cycle  theories  will  then 
need  to explain. 
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exist  but  are not  due  to monetary  policy,  as well  as Maria Gonzalez's 
evidence  for fiscal  cycles  in  developing  countries.  He  argued  that we 
need  something  other  than  the  Phillips  curve-other  than  monetary 
policy-to  make  progress  in this  area.  Drazen  agreed  with  discussant 
Carl Walsh that his  AFPM model  is  rudimentary  at this  stage,  but  he 
argued  that it opens  new  directions  for research,  including  attention  to 
comparative  institutions.  He  suggested  also  that less  ad hoc  loss  func- 
tions  could  be adopted  without  losing  the general flavor of the model's 
results. 
Michael  Klein  observed  that  one  should  be  careful  in  cross-country 
studies  that include  countries  where  elections  can be called,  as the elec- 
tion  dates  may be affected  by economic  conditions.  Ken Rogoff praised 
work  by  Gonzalez  and  others  that  examine  cross-sectional  data;  he 
noted  the interesting  prediction  of Gonzalez's  work that political budget 
cycles  will be largest in middle-income  countries  with  intermediate  lev- 
els of democracy. Richard Portes claimed that in Europe there is evidence 
that economic  cycles  are becoming  synchronized  though  election  timing 
is not.  Drazen  replied  that evidence  does  exist for political fiscal cycles, 
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though  perhaps  these  are stronger in middle-income  countries  (as Gon- 
zalez  suggests)  than in Europe or the United  States. 
Rick Mishkin  noted  that an important  issue  is now  to set  up  central 
banks  so  that they  are able to resist  government  pressure  not  to raise 
interest rates when  they know  they need to do so to keep inflation under 
control.  He  gave  the  example  of  Paul Volcker's targeting  of  monetary 
aggregates,  which  he interpreted  as a smokescreen  that allowed  Volcker 
to raise interest  rates as needed  to subdue  inflation.  More recently, cen- 
tral banks have adopted  inflation targeting in part to deflect pressure  for 
short-run  accommodation  and  to permit  them  to focus  on  long-run  is- 
sues.  Drazen  replied  that  his  focus  was  on  the  nature  of  short-run 
pressure  on the central bank; were  central banks being  asked to actively 
stimulate  the  economy  for electoral  purposes,  or only  to accommodate 
fiscal policy to prevent  swings  in the interest rate? On the other hand,  he 
argued  that his approach,  which  recognizes  the separation  of fiscal and 
monetary  policy-making,  provides  a framework  for discussing  optimal 
policy  institutions.  For example,  if we  conclude  that fiscal policy is most 
prone  to political pressure,  we  may then  want  to look for remedies  that 
deal most  directly with  that problem. 
Ben Bernanke found  it odd  that the competent  policymaker  is the one 
who  creates the distortion  in the fiscal signaling  model.  He pointed  out 
that one might  question  the assumption  that both types  of policymakers 
put  the  same  weight  on social welfare.  He asked  how  we  would  know 
that  someone  who  overspent  is  not  putting  a lower  weight  on  social 
welfare  and a higher weight  on being  in office,  rather than demonstrat- 
ing  competence.  Ken  Rogoff  noted  that  this  issue  is  an  artifact of  the 
model  with  two  types  which  does  not apply when  there is a continuum 
of types,  as in Rogoff and Sibert's original paper. Drazen replied that his 
idea  is  that  the  competent  policymaker  is  more  able  to  economize  on 
low-visibility  or routine  spending,  and  is  thus  more  able  to introduce 
spending  initiatives  that attract votes.  Carl Walsh agreed with  the thrust 
of Bernanke's remark by saying  that a lot of political  signaling  seems  to 
be  about  policymakers'  preferences,  rather than  their  competence;  for 
example,  a  candidate's  promises  are  often  designed  to  reveal  which 
interest groups  he is likely to favor and wants  to attract. 
Olivier  Blanchard distinguished  two  empirical  questions.  The first is 
how  much  of  movements  in  fiscal policy  can be  attributed  to political 
reasons; the second  is whether  these  induced  movements  in fiscal policy 
are of  any  consequence  at the  macroeconomic  level.  He  thought  there 
was  some  evidence  for political  effects  on  fiscal choices  but  that politi- 
cally induced  fiscal decisions  seem  too small to explain  macroeconomic 
fluctuations.  Drazen  agreed  that  there  are two  separate  questions  but Discussion  *  137 
suggested  that the effects of politically induced  fiscal changes  on macro- 
economic  variables remain an open  question. 
Daron Acemoglu  said the opportunistic  model  does not sit as comfort- 
ably  with  fiscal  policy  as  with  monetary  policy.  He  noted  that  fiscal 
policy  actions  such  as appropriations  are easily  observable,  even  before 
the direct effects are seen.  Alesina  disagreed,  suggesting  that fiscal pol- 
icy is the area where we have more uncertainty  and asymmetry  of infor- 
mation.  For example,  we know  more or less whether  the Fed has moved 
or not,  but  it's  realistic  to  assume  that  voters  do  not  understand  the 
intricacies  of  budget  projections  and  legislation.  He  thought  that  this 
difference  lends  some  support  to the fiscal model.  Acemoglu  suggested 
that,  because  of the  two-term  limitation  of U.S.  presidents,  the  model 
would  imply testable differences between  the first and second  terms of a 
given  president. 